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Abstract
An open economy version of the Baxter and King’s [1993] model is constructed with
habit formation to investigate the dynamic and steady-state effects of an expansionary bud-
get policy. In line with empirical evidence, consumption is weakly responsive, investment
is crowded out, the drop in savings drives the current account into deficit and government
spending multipliers display small values. The sensitivity analysis shows that the effective-
ness of the fiscal policy (1) decreases as habit persistence gets stronger, (2) increases with
labor supply responsiveness, (3) falls with trade integration. Finally, we find that habit
persistence weakens the connection between government spending multipliers and both the
elasticity of labor supply and exports-to-GDP ratio.
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1 Introduction
There has been recently a renewed interest in fiscal stimuli among policy makers as an instru-
ment of stabilization. Coincidentally, the exploration of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal
shocks has received notable attention in the empirical literature. While there is a dispersion of
estimates across countries and time periods, it is possible to draw up a list of major empirical
facts. However, as will be shown later, the theoretical explanation of these regularities remains
unsatisfactory as the predictions of the open economy version of the Baxter and King’s [1993]
model are at odds with empirical facts. In this paper, we show that empirical evidence can be
easily reconciled with neoclassical theory as long as agents display a habit-forming behavior.
Empirically, four key regularities can be established. A large strand of the empirical liter-
ature finds that an expansionary budget policy raises both worked hours and GDP, yet reveal
that fiscal multipliers display small values (see e. g. , Perotti [2005] and Mountford and Uhlig
[2008]). More precisely, Perotti [2005] documents a decrease in government spending multipli-
ers in the post-1980 period in comparison with the pre-1980 period. One of the most prominent
and consistent findings of the empirical literature is that investment is crowded out by public
spending in the short-run (see e. g. , Afonso and Sousa [2009], Blanchard and Perotti [2002],
Mountford and Uhlig [2008] and Perotti [2005]). In contrast, empirical findings about the im-
pact of fiscal policy on consumption are rather diverse; in our view, the overall conclusion that
can be drawn is that consumption is weakly responsive to fiscal policy on impact (see e. g. ,
Afonso and Sousa [2009], Mountford and Uhlig [2008], Perotti [2005] in the post-1980 period).
Finally, for 14 European Union countries over the period 1970-2004, Beetsma, Giuliodori and
Klaassen [2008] find that a government spending shock produces a trade balance deficit.
To emphasize the necessity of introducing time non-separable preferences to accommodate
these empirical evidence, it is convenient to shed light on the mechanics of transmission of
fiscal shocks in the baseline neoclassical RBC framework (see e. g. , Karayalc¸in [1999]).1 In
the open economy version of Baxter and King’s [1993] model, households perceive the rise in
public spending as a tax liability. The consecutive fall in the real permanent income induces
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the representative agent to consume less and work more. Due to the fixity of the rate of time
preference, consumption overshoots its steady-state level and thereby releases resources for
capital accumulation. Since saving behavior plays a minor role, the resulting investment boom
drives the current account into deficit and raises the size of expenditure multipliers.
However, these conclusions enter in sharp contradiction with recent empirical findings.
First, consumption reacts very smoothly to a fiscal shock. Second, investment is crowded out
by public spending instead of being crowded-in. Third, short-term and long-term spending
multipliers display small values since they average less than 0.5 in the long-run (see e. g. ,
Hemming et al. [2002] for a review). Finally, while estimates suggest that a fiscal shock causes
a deterioration in the external asset position, empirical evidence documented by Freund [2005]
reveals that short-run current account deficits episodes are more associated with a decline in
savings than with an increase in investment.
Our main contribution is to show that the introduction of a habit-forming behavior in a
two-good open economy version of the Baxter and King’s [1993] can account for the empirical
evidence related to the macroeconomic effects of fiscal shocks. Implicitly, in our framework,
the consumers’ reaction to a fiscal impulse is a mix of Ricardian and Keynesian behaviors. In
a Ricardian manner, forward-looking consumers react to the rise in government expenditure
by cutting real expenditure. In a Keynesian manner, households reduce their real consumption
on impact but by a smaller amount than the decline in their disposable income. As higher
government spending withdraws resources to the private sector and households’ consumption
reacts weakly to the fiscal shock, an excess demand arises in the home goods market. Hence, due
to consumption inertia, investment is crowded out by public spending. The fall in investment
lowers expenditure multipliers which thereby display smaller sizes than those predicted by
standard models assuming time separability in utility. Since households wish to sustain their
original standard of living, the resulting drop in private savings worsens the current account. In
addition, the economic boom following a fiscal expansion is associated with a decumulation of
internationally traded bonds, thus corroborating the counter-cyclicality of the current account
3
found in the data (see e. g. , Backus, Kehoe and Kydland [1994]).
Oddly, so far, the literature has been silent about the connection between households’
preference parameters and the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Plotting initial and steady-state
expenditure multipliers against the weight of habits in utility, we show that stronger habit
persistence lowers the effectiveness of fiscal policy. The reason is that (1) in the short-term,
investment is crowded out further by public spending, and (2) in the long-term, consumption
and exports fall by a larger amount. A second key policy question is how consumption inertia
and labor responsiveness interact in determining the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Like Baxter
and King [1993], numerical experiments revealed that government spending multipliers rise as
labor supply is more responsive. However, existence of consumption inertia prevents a balanced-
budget fiscal policy from displaying an expenditure multiplier greater than unity by moderating
the initial stimulus of demand triggered by higher public spending. Finally, estimating the
response of multipliers to a greater trade openness, we find that trade integration reduces the
effectiveness of fiscal policy. Yet, habit persistence weakens the relationship between multipliers
and trade openness.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop an open econ-
omy version of the neoclassical model with habit formation. Section 3 shows how consumption
inertia allows to reconcile the predictions of the neoclassical model with recent empirical evi-
dence and discusses the mechanics of transmission of fiscal shocks. In section 4, we conduct a
sensitivity analysis by estimating the relationship between the effectiveness of fiscal policy and
key preference parameters. Section 5 summarizes our main results and concludes.
2 An Open Economy Model with Habit Formation
We consider a semi-small open economy that is populated by a large number of identical
households and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever. The country is assumed to
be semi-small in the sense that it is price-taker in international capital markets but is large
enough on world good markets to influence the price of its export goods.
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2.1 Households
At each instant the representative household consumes domestic goods and foreign goods de-
noted by cD and cF , respectively, which are aggregated by means of a CES function:
c =
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
cD
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (cF )φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (1)
where ϕ is the weight of the domestic good in the overall consumption bundle (0 < ϕ < 1)
and φ corresponds to the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
consumption goods.
The representative agent is endowed with a unit of time, supplies a fraction n(t) as labor,
and the remainder l(t) ≡ 1 − n(t) is consumed as leisure. At any instant of time, households
derive utility not only from their current real consumption c(t) but also from their current level
of habits denoted by s(t). Hence, assuming that the felicity function is additively separable
in consumption and labor, the representative household maximizes the following objective
function:
U =
∫ ∞
0
{
1
1− ²
[
c(t)
(s(t))γ
]1−²
− γN n(t)
1+ 1
σN
1 + 1σN
}
e−βtdt, (2)
where β is the consumer’s discount rate, ² > 0 corresponds to the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, and γ > 0 stands for the weight attached to habits s into utility; σN > 0 is the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply (or intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor supply).
The habitual standard of living is defined as a distributed lag on past real consumption:
s(t) = σ
∫ t
−∞
c
(
cD(τ), cF (τ)
)
e−σ(t−τ)dτ, (3)
where the parameter σ indexes the relative weight of recent consumption in determining the
reference stock s. Differentiating equation (3) w. r. t. time gives the law of motion of habit
stock:
s˙(t) = σ [c(t)− s(t)] . (4)
Intuitively, the larger σ, the greater the weight of consumption in the recent past in determining
the stock of habits, and the faster the reference stock adjusts to current expenditure.
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In line with Carroll, Overland and Weil [2000], we have assumed that the utility derived
from current and past consumption takes an iso-elastic form. The felicity function can be
rewritten as u (c, s) = 11−²
[
(c)1−γ
(
c
s
)γ]1−² according to which, agents derive utility from a
geometric weighted average of absolute and relative consumption where γ is the weight of
relative consumption. If γ = 0, the comparison of real consumption to the reference stock turns
out to be irrelevant and the case of time separability in preferences is obtained. If γ is positive,
agents care about their relative consumption in deriving utility. In this case, they are aware
that for a given fall in current consumption, the utility loss is now reduced by the consecutive
decrease in habits. Because the slope of the indifference curves along a constant consumption
path rises, individuals’ impatience increases. Therefore, real consumption deviates from the
usual perfectly smooth temporal profile and declines over time, whenever the real interest rate
is unchanged.
By shifting the time paths for consumption and thereby savings, the introduction of habits
affects the long-term response of consumption to a change of private wealth dictated by the
long-run intertemporal elasticity of substitution (henceforth, IES). More specifically, by noting
that habits coincide with real consumption in the long run, setting c = s into the iso-elastic
function above yields a long-run IES denoted by ν equal to 1[γ+²(1−γ)] which is higher than
the standard IES 1/² as long as ² > 1. By contrast, the reference stock is fixed over a short
interval of time. Hence, the short-horizon and long-horizon elasticities will not coincide as long
as γ > 0.2
Households supply n(t) units of labor services for which they receive the wage rate w(t).
They hold the physical capital stock for which they receive the capital rental rate. In addition,
they accumulate internationally traded bonds, b(t), that yields net interest rate earnings r?b(t),
expressed in terms of the foreign good. Denoting by T the lump-sum taxes, the flow budget
constraint is equal to households’ real disposable income less consumption pcc and investment
I expenditure:
b˙(t) =
1
p(t)
{
r?p(t)b(t) +
(
rK(t) + δK
)
k(t) + w(t)n(t)− pc (p(t)) c(t)− I(t)− T (t)
}
, (5)
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where pc is the consumption price index and p the relative price of the foreign good (or the
real exchange rate). Investment I leads to capital accumulation:
k˙(t) = I(t)− δKk(t), (6)
where 0 ≤ δK < 1 is a fixed depreciation rate.
2.2 Firms
A large number of identical and perfectly competitive firms produce a final good which can
be consumed domestically, invested or exported. They use physical capital k and labor n,
according to a constant returns to scale production function, Y = F (k, n), which is assumed
to have the usual neoclassical properties of positive and diminishing marginal products. Factor
markets are assumed to be competitive, so that capital and labor are paid their marginal
products, i. e. , Fk = rK + δK for capital and Fn = w for labor.
2.3 Government
The government finances public spending by raising lump-sum taxes T according to the fol-
lowing balanced condition T = gD+pgF ; gD and pgF correspond to the government purchases
falling on the domestic and the foreign good respectively, measured in domestic units.
2.4 Macroeconomic Dynamics
In an open economy model with a representative agent having perfect foresight, a constant rate
of time preference and perfect access to world capital markets, we require that β = r? in order
to generate an interior solution. This standard assumption made in the literature implies that
the marginal utility of wealth, λ, will undergo a discrete jump when individuals receive new
information and must remain constant over time from thereon.3
The adjustment of the semi-small open economy towards the steady-state is described by
a fourth order dynamic system which comprises the accumulation equation of habits (i. e. ,
eq. (4)) and the dynamic equation for the real exchange rate dynamics which equalizes the
rates of return on domestic rK and foreign assets r? + p˙/p.4 The third equation is the law
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of motion of real consumption which relates the optimal profile of c to the difference between
the consumption-based real interest rate, rc = r?+ (1− αc) p˙p , and the rate of time preference,
denoted by ρ(t):
c˙
c
=
1
²
[
1 + σξc²sγ(1−²)
] [
r? + (1− αc) p˙
p
− ρ(t)
]
, (7)
where 0 < 1²
[
1 + σξc²sγ(1−²)
]
stands for the short-run IES under time non separable preferences
which is smaller than 1/². The key point to note is that the rate of time preference is variable
over time. The reason is that habits gradually adjust to their steady-state value which in turn
leads to a discrepancy between the current and future marginal utility of consumption.
Denoting by X the exports to the rest of the world, we impose a domestic good market
clearing condition to fully describe the macroeconomic equilibrium:5
k˙ = F (k, n)− cD −X (p)− δkk − gD, (8)
where investment adjusts to equalize supply and aggregate demand along the transitional path.
Hence, capital accumulation is affected by habit persistence which impinges on consumption
in the domestic good cD.
Consumption inertia also influences the transitional adjustment of the stock of financial
wealth denoted by a and thereby the current account dynamics which is the reflection of
savings and investment behavior:
ca(t) = p(t)b˙(t) = a˙(t)− k˙ − bp˙(t), (9)
where we denote by ca the current account measured in terms of the domestic good; the stock
of financial wealth a(t) ≡ p(t)b(t) + k(t) evolves according to the following law of motion:
a˙(t) = rK(t)a(t) + w(t)n(t) − T − pc (p(t)) c(t) where savings are equal to the real disposable
income less total expenditure in consumption goods.
2.5 Steady-State
We now discuss the salient features of the steady-state. The assumptions of constant returns
to scale and an exogenously given world interest rate imply that the steady-state capital-labor
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ratio remains unchanged after a fiscal expansion. Since the steady-state value of the capital-
labor ratio remains fixed, i. e. k˜n˜ =
(
αK
r?+δK
) 1
1−αK , the marginal product of labor and thereby
the wage rate are also unaffected in the long-run. By substituting the wage rate into the labor
supply decision evaluated at the steady-state, we get n˜ =
[
1
γN
λ¯
p˜ (1− αK)
(
k˜
n˜
)αK]σN
. Hence,
a decrease in private wealth measured in terms of the domestic good (i. e. , a rise in λ¯/p˜)
stimulates labor supply in the long-run.
Setting c˙ = p˙ = 0 and using the fact that real consumption coincides with the habit stock
once economy reaches the long-term equilibrium enables us to derive the steady-state level of
real consumption:
c˜ =
[(
β + σ
β + σ (1− γ)
)
pcλ¯
p˜
]−ν
. (10)
As long as households attribute a positive weight to relative consumption (i. e. , γ > 0) the
rate of change of c is influenced by the long-term IES with time non separable preferences,
ν, which exceeds νγ=0 = 1/². Therefore, confronted to a given reduction of private wealth,
habit-forming consumers experience a larger steady-state fall in consumption than households
displaying standard preferences.6
The market-clearing condition for the home good determines the steady-state value of the
real exchange rate. The relative price p˜ adjusts so that the production of domestic goods is
exactly outweighed by a demand counterpart:
Y
(
λ¯, p˜
)
= cD
(
λ¯, p˜
)
+X (p˜) + δKk
(
λ¯, p˜
)
+ gD, (11)
where we have rewritten c˜D = pc (1− αc) c˜ as cD
(
λ¯, p˜
)
. Equation (11) allows us to express the
steady-state value of the real exchange rate as a function of λ¯ and gD, i. e. , p˜ = p
(
λ¯, gD
)
, with
pλ¯ > 0 and pgD < 0. Consider a rise in g
D, assuming that δK = 0 for simplicity. If preferences
are time separable and the economy is closed, a fiscal expansion crowds out consumption in
the domestic good cD by reducing private wealth which results in a multiplier inferior to 1. If
preferences are time non separable, cD declines dramatically in response to the rise in λ¯ which
yields a multiplier much less than 1. Finally, in an open economy with habits, private demand
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for the domestic good shrinks more in comparison with a closed economy through an additional
channel. The long-run real exchange appreciation triggers a larger reduction in the size of the
long-run multiplier by causing a decline in exports and by inducing agents to consume less of
the domestic good.
In a framework that considers standard preferences, the current account is mainly affected
by investment fluctuations, due to the fixity of the time preference rate which implies a flat
temporal path for consumption. Instead, the assumption of time non separable preferences
implies that both investment decisions and consumption choices affect the external asset po-
sition. More precisely, the linearized version of the intertemporal solvency condition allows
the steady-state level of net foreign asset position to be determined by the long-run levels of
physical capital and habits:
(
b˜− b0
)
= Φ1
(
k˜ − k0
)
+ Φ2 (s˜− s0) with Φ1 < 0 and Φ2 > 0
for all parametrization. The intertemporal budget constraint describes the long-run trade-off
between capital and habits on the one hand, and net foreign assets consistent with solvency on
the other hand. A steady-state decrease in habits (increase in capital) causes a decumulation
of the stock of foreign assets by causing a drop in savings (a rise in investment).
3 Fiscal Expansion and Habit Persistence
In this section, we explore the macroeconomics effects of a rise in government spending on the
domestic good (gD). While the model can be solved analytically, we propose some numerical
simulations to illustrate key theoretical results and discusses fiscal policy implications.7
3.1 Benchmark Parametrization
We start by describing the calibration that we use as a benchmark. The world interest rate
which is equal to the subjective time discount rate β is set to 3.5%. The elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods φ is set to 1.5. Exports are assumed to take a power form
X = X (p) = γXpνX with γX > 0 a scaling parameter. The real exchange rate elasticity of
exports denoted by νX is set to 0.8 in line with estimates by Bayoumi [1999].8 Government
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spending as a share of GDP g/Y is 20%. The import content of government expenditure is set
to 10%. Finally, the production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form Y = F (k, n) = kαKn1−αK
with the share of capital in output which is assumed to equal 0.35. Finally, we set δK to 0.035
so as to be consistent with a ratio investment-GDP roughly equal to 18%.9 All the previous
parameter values remain unchanged in the analysis below. Next, we turn to the parameters
for which we conduct some sensitivity analysis.
Our baseline setting for the weight of the domestic good ϕ is 0.95 which corresponds to an
import content of consumption (αc) of 15% approximately. Two additional critical parameters
are the weight of habits in utility, γ, and the speed σ at which the standard of living catches
up with current consumption. From empirical results provided by Sommer [2007], estimations
of γ fall in a range between 0.7-0.8. We set γ to 0.8. The relative-risk aversion parameter, ²,
is set to 2.5, yielding a long-term IES of 0.77. We set σ to 0.65 which means that the time
required to close 95% of the discrepancy between s(t) and c(t) following a change in c(t) is
roughly four and a half periods. The last critical parameter is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution for labor supply σN . In our benchmark parametrization, we set σN to 0.4 which
is halfway of the values documented by the empirical literature and chosen by RBC models.10
Quantitative estimation of macroeconomic effects of a rise in government spending shock
by 1 percentage point of initial output are reported in Table 1. We consider seven alternative
scenarios: time separable preferences (i. e. , γ = 0), benchmark parametrization (i. e. , γ = 0.8,
σ = 0.65, σN = 0.4, ϕ = 0.95), a smaller weight of habits in utility (i. e. , γ = 0.3), a faster
speed at which habits catch up with current consumption (i. e. , σ = 0.95), a weakly responsive
labor supply (i. e. , σN = 0.2), a highly responsive labor supply (i. e. , σN = 1), and a larger
trade openness (i. e. , ϕ = 0.825). Computed transitional paths of key variables are displayed
in Figures 1 where we abbreviate time separable preferences in “TS pref.”. In all figures, the
responses of consumption, GDP, employment and investment are expressed as deviations from
initial steady-state values scaled by initial GDP (in percentage).
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3.2 Steady-State Effects of a Permanent Fiscal Expansion
We now discuss the steady-state changes after a fiscal expansion summarized in Table 1A.
By increasing lump-sum taxes and thereby lowering the representative agent’s real disposable
income, a permanent balanced-budget fiscal expansion induces agents to raise labor effort while
reducing real consumption. The positive labor supply effect stimulates capital by shifting up its
marginal product schedule which boosts output. Whereas households’ consumption falls, the
stimulus of output is not large enough to compensate the excess of demand in the home good
market triggered by higher public spending. This requires a rise in the relative price of the
domestic good (i. e. , a real exchange rate appreciation). The fall in p depresses consumption
in the domestic good c˜D more and causes a decline in exports X˜, regardless of the form of
preferences.
Table 1A provides a sensitivity analysis regarding the long-term effects of raising public
spending. The first line allows us to compare the long-run adjustment of consumption de-
pending on whether preferences are time separable or time non separable. Whereas consumers
cut their real expenditure by around 0.45% of initial GDP if preferences are time separable
(i. e. , γ = 0), c˜ declines by roughly 0.65% for the benchmark parametrization (i. e. , γ = 0.8).
Intuitively, as the weight of habits in utility increases, households are more reluctant to cut
their real expenditure in the short-run. Thereby, households decumulate more financial wealth.
Since agents must ultimately satisfy their intertemporal solvency condition, a larger steady-
state fall in consumption is required. From the fifth line, the necessary decline in the stock of
foreign assets rises from 0.3% to about 0.45% of initial GDP as γ is raised from 0 to 0.8. The
response of output to a fiscal impulse will be addressed later in section 4.
——————————————————
< Please insert Table 1 about here >
——————————————————
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3.3 Habits Reconcile Theory with Empirical Facts
In this subsection, we discuss the short-run reaction of the open economy and show that the
introduction of habit persistence in consumption allows to reconcile the predictions of the
neoclassical model with recent empirical evidence.
Consumption Reacts Weakly to a Fiscal Expansion
Mountford and Uhlig [2008] found that consumption does not change significantly in re-
sponse to a positive spending shock in the U.S. This empirical result has been recently confirmed
by Afonso and Sousa [2009] for additional OECD countries like the U.K., Germany, and Italy.
To address the tenuous response of consumption, it is convenient to simplify the analysis by
assuming that the capital stock is fixed, which implies a one-dimensional stable path for con-
sumption. Substituting the stable solution for c(t) evaluated at time t = 0 into the households’
budget constraint yields the initial optimal reaction of consumption:
c(0) =
(
σ + µ1
σ
)[
1 +
Π˜
Λ˜
r?µ1
σ
]
s0 − µ1
σ
r? − µ1
Λ˜
p˜r? [b0 +W (0)]
pc
, (12)
where Π˜ ≥ 1, Λ˜ = (r? − µ1)−Π˜
(σ+µ1
σ
)
r?; −µ1σ r
?−µ1
Λ˜
represents the short-run marginal propen-
sity to consume (henceforth, MPC) of the real permanent income p˜r
?[b0+W (0)]
pc
. In a small
open economy model where the relative price of foreign goods p is exogenous, Π˜ = 1 and
Λ˜ = −µ1σ (σ + r?), the short-run MPC simplifies to r
?−µ1
σ+r? . If preferences are time separa-
ble (i. e. , γ = 0), the stable root µ1 reduces to −σ which results in a MPC equal to unity.
In contrast, as long as people care about habits in deriving utility (i. e. , γ > 0), inequality
σ > −µ1 holds, which implies that the short-run MPC is unambiguously inferior to one. The
explanation relies upon the behavior of the time preference rate which is variable over time.
Following a fiscal expansion, agents expect a long-term fall in their usual standard of living.
However, when the fiscal expansion is implemented, the stock of habits does not change, so
that the marginal utility of current consumption exceeds that of future consumption. This
provides a strong incentive to reallocate expenditure in present and yields a smaller than unity
short-term MPC. Consequently, real consumption falls on impact but less than the decline in
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the real disposable income. Considering now the case of an endogenous real exchange rate,
the short-term MPC rises. The reason is that the real exchange rate depreciation allows for
a smoother real consumption temporal path. Such a consumption behavior is consistent with
the intertemporal solvency condition as long as consumption falls by a larger amount in the
short-run than if the real exchange rate was constant over time. Yet, the MPC is always smaller
than unity, as long as Π˜ < r
?
r?−µ1 , which holds for our baseline parametrization.
Figure 1(a) displays the dynamic adjustment of consumption in the benchmark case and
compares it to alternative scenarios. In all scenarios, households behave in a Ricardian manner
and thus react to the fall in their after-tax lifetime income by reducing their real expenditure.
However, in a Keynesian manner, consumption does not adjust immediately and fully, as long
as household care about habits in deriving utility. More precisely, the short-run MPC displays
a value inferior to one. Hence, habit-consumers prefer to adjust less-than-fully now and more-
than-fully later (see the blue line). By contrast, households having time separable preferences
exhibit a much larger short-run MPC which results in an over-reaction of consumption on
impact (see the red dotted line). Openness is also an important factor in determining the size
of the response of consumption. More precisely, a rise in trade integration moderates the drop
in consumption by softening the reduction in private wealth measured in domestic units (see
the black line). Finally, as expected, the initial response of consumption to a fiscal shock is all
the weaker as labor supply is more responsive since the fall in the real permanent income is
less pronounced (see the dotted black line).
Public Spending Crowds Out Investment
One of the most prominent and consistent findings of the empirical literature on fiscal policy
is the crowding-out of investment by public spending. However, the Keynesian explanation of
this empirical fact remains unsatisfactory.11 Similarly, the prediction of the baseline neoclassical
model, as exemplified by Baxter and King [1993], is also at odds with empirical facts. As we
shall see now, short-run consumption inertia plays a major role in accommodating this empirical
fact. To derive the initial response of investment, we differentiate the market-clearing condition
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for the home good:
dI(0) = dY (0)−Θdp(0)− (cD/c)dc(0)− dgD, (13)
where Θ ≡ Xp
[
νX + c
D
X φαc
]
> 0 captures the impact of a change in the real exchange rate
on exports and consumption. On the one hand, the stimulus of output and the fall in private
demand (i. e. , exports and private consumption) releases resources for capital accumulation
(see the first and second terms on the RHS of (13)). On the other hand, higher public purchases
withdraw resources from the private sector, which implies the possibility that investment falls
in the short-term (see the last term on the RHS of (13)). If preferences are time separable
(i. e. , γ = 0), output rises and consumption falls dramatically which results in a short-run
stimulus of capital accumulation. In contrast, as long as consumption inertia is strong enough,
an excess of demand arises in the home goods market which must be eliminated by a fall in
investment.
How do preference parameters influence the size of the crowding-out of investment by public
spending? For various values of preference parameters, the resulting dynamic adjustment of
investment is illustrated in Figure 1(f). If consumption inertia is strong enough (i e. , γ = 0.8,
σ = 0.95) and/or labor supply is weakly responsive (i e. , σN = 0.2), investment expenditure
is more likely to be crowded out by public spending in line with empirical evidence (see the
blue and black lines). The reason is that consumption does not decrease and output does not
rise enough to more than offset the rise in public spending. By contrast, an expansionary
budget policy stimulates capital accumulation as long as γ approaches 0 and/or labor supply is
highly responsive (see the red dotted, black dotted and red lines). Initial investment responses
relative to initial GDP are summarized in the fourth line in Table 1B. If habits are irrelevant
or weak (i. e. , γ = 0 or γ = 0.3), or labor supply reacts strongly (i. e. , σN = 1), investment is
crowded in and rises by about 0.10-0.20% of initial GDP. Conversely, in the baseline scenario or
assuming a high speed of habits, a rise in government spending by 1% of GDP lowers investment
by 0.13-0.15% of GDP and crowds out further investment (by 0.25%) if labor supply is weakly
responsive. Trade openness also influences considerably the size of the crowding-out. More
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precisely, a rise in export-to-GDP ratio from 11% to 21% moderates the drop in investment
from 0.13% of GDP to 0.02%. The reason is that a rise in trade openness amplifies the negative
impact of the real exchange appreciation on exports.
A Current Account Deficit Attributed to Savings Behavior
An important issue in an open economy framework is the reaction of the external asset
position to a fiscal shock. In accordance with estimates by Beetsma, Giuliodori and Klaassen
[2008] who find that an increase in public spending yields a fall in trade balance, the open
economy experiences a current account deficit in all scenarios, as shown in the sixth line in
Table 1B. Yet, the explanation of the current account deficit differs across cases. To see
this, recall that the current account balance net of the depreciation of foreign assets, i. e.
ca(t) + bp˙(t), is equal to savings a˙(t) less capital accumulation k˙(t). We depicted the current
account adjustment for the benchmark scenario and time separable preferences in Figures 1(d)
and 1(e) respectively. As portrayed in Figure 1(d), if consumption inertia is strong enough,
the initial fall in investment fails to offset the large drop in savings, which results in a current
account deficit. This conclusion is supported by empirical evidence documented by Freund
[2005] according to which current account deficits are mostly demand-driven in the short-
term. As summarized in line 6 of Table 1B, higher values of γ leads to a greater current
account deficit triggered by a larger reduction in savings. Conversely, if preferences are time
separable, as considered in Figure 1(e), the consumption behavior causes a rise in savings and
an investment boom, the latter leading to a current account deficit on impact. Besides habit
persistence, trade openness raises the size of the current account deficit as well. The reason is
that as the economy is more open, government spending crowds out consumption by a smaller
amount which results in a larger reduction in savings while investment falls much less. Our
results are in line with those documented by Corsetti and Mu¨ller [2006] who find that more
open economies than that of the US (Canada and the UK) experience greater current account
deficits while the effects of fiscal shocks on investment are moderate.
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3.4 Fiscal Policy Transmission with Habits
We now discuss the adjustment of the open economy illustrated in Figures 1. For pedagogical
purpose, we begin with the more simple case displayed in the red dotted line where agents
do not care about habits (i. e. , γ = 0). In response to the fall in real disposable income,
individuals cut sizeably their real expenditure and work more. As the real exchange rate must
overshoot its steady-state value, the fall in the relative price drives down exports and depresses
further consumption in the domestic good while stimulating labor supply. The resulting excess
of supply in the home good market allows investment to be crowded in which yields a current
account deficit. The dynamic response of employment, pictured in Figure 1(c), shows that the
real exchange rate depreciation exerts a negative impact on worked hours. Yet, as illustrated
in Figure 1(b), capital accumulation is strong enough to push up output which increases mono-
tonically. Over the transition, consumption follows a rising temporal path driven by the higher
than steady-state consumption-based real interest rate.
Adding habits change dramatically the mechanics of transmission of fiscal shocks. The
benchmark scenario is portrayed in the blue line. On impact, consumption responds weakly
so that investment is crowded out. As illustrated in Figure 1(b), the short-run decumulation
of physical capital and the gradual decline in employment drives down output over a first
phase, which contrasts markedly with the dynamic adjustment without habits. Regarding the
consumption-side, the initial rise in the time preference rate ρ is large enough to offset the
increase in the consumption-based real interest rate and leads to a decreasing temporal path
for households’ real expenditure portrayed in Figure 1(a). The gradual decline in the reference
stock reduces ρ which falls monotonically. Once consumption has decreased by a sufficient
amount, the economy experiences an investment boom, which boosts GDP after five periods
and exerts a negative impact on the current account. Finally, after 12 periods, the declining
time preference rate equalizes the slippery slope side of the consumption-based real interest
rate’s hump-shaped transitional path, which induces a rising temporal path for consumption,
as illustrated in Figure 1(a).
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—————————————————————————————-
< Please insert Figures 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), 1(d), 1(e), 1(f) about here >
—————————————————————————————-
4 Effectiveness of the Fiscal Policy and Habit Persistence
Our task in this section is to investigate the connection between the effectiveness of fiscal policy
and key households’ preference parameters. More specifically, we provide an explanation of the
small value of government spending multipliers found in the data and its declining size in the
post-1980 period.
4.1 The Long-Term Government Spending Multiplier
We first investigate the size of the long-term balanced-budget expenditure multiplier by differ-
entiating the home good market-clearing condition w. r. t. gD:12
dY˜
dgD
=
c˜D
c˜
dc˜
dgD
+
X˜
p˜
(
νX + αcφ
c˜D
p˜
)
dp˜
dgD
+ 1. (14)
According to the first term on the RHS of (14), the reduction of real consumption which spreads
over the two goods, depresses private demand for the domestic good and thereby output. The
second term on the RHS of (14) reflects the negative impact of the long-term real exchange
rate appreciation on cD and exports after a rise in gD. Whereas private demand falls after a
fiscal expansion falling on the domestic good, its decline is less than the rise in government
spending by 1 percentage point of GDP. Consequently, in either seven scenarios, the expenditure
multiplier is positive but inferior to 1. The response of output varies markedly across the seven
scenarios. In particular, as habit persistence gets stronger (i. e. , γ gets closer to unity), real
consumption and exports fall by a larger amount which result in a smaller spending multiplier.
Lines 2-4 in Table 1A shows the effects on output components. Each component is scaled by
initial GDP which enables us to disentangle their contribution to the response of output. The
multiplier is equal to nearly 0.7 if preferences are time separable, a value which is much higher
than empirical evidence suggests. If γ = 0.8, output rises by only 0.5%: consumption in the
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domestic good and exports fall by 0.54% and 0.06% of initial GDP respectively while investment
increases by 0.09% of initial GDP. Trade integration also slightly reduces the effectiveness of
fiscal policy by reducing exports more, though moderating the drop in c˜D.
4.2 The Short-Term Government Spending Multiplier
We now investigate the size of the short-term expenditure multiplier by evaluating the home
good market-clearing condition at time t = 0 and differentiating w. r. t. gD:
dY (0)
dgD
=
cD
c
dc(0)
dgD
+Θ
dp(0)
dgD
+
dI(0)
dgD
+ 1, (15)
with Θ ≡ Xp
[
νX + c
D
X φαc
]
> 0. The first term on the RHS of (15) represents the negative
influence of the short-term decline in consumption. While at first glance consumption inertia
should raise the effectiveness of the fiscal policy by softening the drop in real consumption
on impact, the second and the third terms counteract the positive influence of habits. More
precisely, as habit persistence gets stronger, the real exchange rate appreciates more on impact
which in turn depresses exports more. Additionally, investment is crowded out by a larger
amount by public spending. Since these two effects predominate, the fiscal policy is less effective
as γ approaches unity and σ takes higher values.
Numerical experiments reported in Table 1C show that across cases, the initial multiplier
displays a smaller value than the steady-state multiplier due to the larger drop in private
demand. As in the long-run, habits persistence lowers sizeably the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
As we can see in lines 2-4 in Table 1B, for the benchmark parametrization, following a rise in
government spending by 1 percentage point of GDP, consumption in the domestic good and
exports fall by 0.36% and 0.11% respectively, while investment drops by 0.13% of initial GDP.
Hence, the fiscal impulse yields a rise in output by only 0.4%, a value close to VAR results
summarized by Hemming et al. [2002].13 Instead, if γ is set to zero, the multiplier exceeds 0.5 as
the open economy experiences an investment boom, though consumption declines dramatically.
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4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Our analysis shows that three critical parameters matter in determining the value of government
spending multipliers: (1) the weight of relative consumption in utility γ, (2) the elasticity of
labor supply σN , and (3) trade integration which we measure by the ratio of exports-to-GDP
ratio. We have conducted a sensitivity analysis with respect to these three parameters. We
allow γ to vary from 0 to 0.94, σN from 0.05 to 4, and ϕ from 0.98 to 0.20 implying an exports-
to-GDP ratio which falls between 7%-52%. Figures 2(a)-2(h) plot the long-term and short-
term expenditure multipliers against these three key parameters, considering time separable
preferences in Figures 2(e) and 2(h).14
Figure 2(a) shows that the size of the long-term expenditure multiplier monotonically de-
creases as individuals pay more attention to relative consumption in deriving utility. The
closer to unity γ, the larger the long-term fall in real consumption and thereby the smaller the
long-term expenditure multiplier. Interestingly, the short-term expenditure multiplier displays
a non monotonic pattern w. r. t. γ. As shown in Figure 2(b), the size of the impact multi-
plier rises slightly as long as γ exceeds 0.9. As stressed above, stronger habits moderate the
short-term fall in consumption but amplify the decline in investment. If consumption inertia
is strong enough, the former effect prevails, which results in a positive relationship between
habit persistence and spending multipliers.
—————————————————————————————-
< Please insert Figures 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 2(g), 2(h) here >
—————————————————————————————
As illustrated in Figures 2(c)-2(d), like Baxter and King [1993], both long-term and short-
term expenditure multipliers rise with the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor σN .
The reason is that following a demand boom triggered by public spending, domestic supply
must rise. The more responsive labor supply, the larger the steady-state rise in employment,
which boosts further capital accumulation in the long-run. However, as long as γ is set to
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0.8, the long-term expenditure multiplier does no longer exceed unity for plausible values of
σN . More precisely, raising the elasticity of labor supply from 0.1 to 2 yields a rise in the
long-term expenditure multiplier from 0.2 to 0.9. Setting γ equal to zero now raises dY˜ /dgD
from 0.3 to 1.1 as illustrated in Figure 2(e). The explanation is that the steady-state reduction
of consumption is more pronounced as long as agents care about past consumption. This
consumption adjustment moderates the demand boom for the domestic good and thereby the
long-run stimulus of output.
Perotti [2005] finds stronger GDP response to government spending shocks in the pre-1980
period than in the post-1980 period. Since one major development that has occurred since the
middle seventies is that all industrialized economies have become more open over time, we now
tackle the question: how trade openness influences effectiveness of fiscal policy? Figures 2(f)
and 2(g) plot the expenditure multipliers against the exports-to-GDP ratio. Interestingly, both
steady-state and impact multipliers fall as trade openness increases. More precisely, a rise in
the exports-to-GDP ratio from 10% to 50% lowers the steady-state multiplier from 0.49 to 0.43.
The smaller response of GDP to a fiscal impulse in more open economies is supported by recent
findings documented by Beetsma et al. [2008]. To understand the negative relationship between
government spending multipliers and openness, recall that in a more open economy, a higher
import content of consumption (i. e. , an increase in αc) induces households to substitute further
the domestic for the foreign goods after a given real exchange rate appreciation. Additionally,
because the exports-to-GDP ratio is higher, a fiscal expansion crowds out exports more. Finally,
2(g) shows that the short-term multiplier reacts more to a rise in trade openness due to the
real exchange rate overshooting behavior on impact.
One additional striking result is that habit persistence weakens the relationship between
expenditure multipliers and trade openness. More specifically, increasing trade openness from
10% to 37% (by reducing ϕ from 0.95 to 0.5) lowers the long-run spending multiplier from
0.49 to 0.46 in the case of habits, and from 0.68 to 0.58 if preferences are time separable, as
illustrated in Figures 2(f) and 2(h) respectively. Hence, a rise in trade integration should have
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played an important role in driving down the size of government spending multipliers over
time, but it cannot account for the whole decrease in the effectiveness of fiscal policy in the
post-1980 period as long as habits are considered.15 The small reaction of spending multipliers
to globalization originates from the strong sensitivity of consumption in the domestic good to
trade openness in the case of habits.16
5 Conclusion
Open economy versions of Baxter and King’s [1993] model considering standard preferences
find that consumption reacts strongly to a fiscal shock so that investment is crowded in. The
consecutive capital accumulation yields a current account deficit and results in large govern-
ment spending multipliers (see e. g. , Karayalc¸in [1999]). However, recent empirical evidence
cast doubt over the predictions of the baseline neoclassical model. In our contribution, we
have shown that the introduction of a habit index into the utility function helps improving the
predictive power of the Baxter and King’s [1993] model by modifying the chain of events fol-
lowing a fiscal expansion. More precisely, following a rise in public spending, real consumption
exhibits a tenuous response as habits imply a sluggish response of consumption to the decrease
in the real disposable income. Since the fall in private consumption is not large enough to offset
higher public demand for the domestic good, investment is crowded out by public spending
in the short-run, which pushes down the size of the short-term spending multiplier. At the
same time, savings drop dramatically, which yields a current account deficit. Because habit-
consumers prefer to adjust real consumption less-than-fully now and more-than-fully later, the
resulting sizeable steady-state decline in real consumption lowers the size of the long-term
spending multiplier.
One additional important issue that our paper addresses is the role of trade openness. We
find that larger trade integration drives down spending multipliers by depressing exports more
and yields a greater current account deficit. These results are in line with estimates by Beetsma,
Giuliodori and Klaassen [2008] which show that a public spending shock has a smaller effect
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on output of more open economies, and a stronger effect on the trade balance which exhibits
a stronger deterioration. Finally, since one major development that has occurred since the
middle seventies is that all industrialized economies have become more open over time, the
negative connection between trade openness and effectiveness of the fiscal policy could provide
an explanation of the weaker GDP response to government spending shocks in the post-1980
period than in the pre-1980 period found in the data.
Notes
1Baxter and King [1993], Heijdra [1998] who relaxes the perfect competition assumption on product markets,
Gal´ı et al. [2007] who introduce “rule-of-thumb” consumers, Karayalc¸in [1999] who considers an open-economy
version of the Baxter and King’s model, commonly assume that preferences are time separable. One notable
exception is Karayalc¸in [2003] who constructs a one good open-economy model in which agents possess habit-
forming endogenous time discount rates. Karayalc¸in’s article pursues a different goal and his results differ
from ours. Karayalc¸in aims at providing an explanation of endogenous persistence in response to fiscal shocks;
additionally, the savings behavior and the resulting current account adjustment enter in sharp contrast with
those derived in our paper. More specifically, Karayalc¸in finds that consumption over-reacts, private savings
rises which together with the fall in investment drives the current account into surplus.
2More specifically, if we calculate the IES over a short interval of time, we will find that the short-run IES is
smaller than 1/².
3We drop the exposition of first-order static conditions for reason of space. Full discussion can be retrieved
in a longer manuscript.
4Since the number of predetermined variables (s and k) equals the number of negative eigenvalues, and the
number of jump variables (c and p) equals the number of positive eigenvalues, there is a unique two-dimensional
convergent path towards the steady-state. Equilibrium dynamics and formal solutions can be retrieved in a
longer version of the paper.
5Exports are positively correlated with the relative price of foreign goods, i. e. Xp > 0. An increase in p,
makes the domestic good cheaper and thereby stimulates exports.
6 Additionally, equation (10) shows that c˜ depends on a novel preference parameter σ. A higher σ and thus
a faster catching-up of the habit stock softens the change of c˜ by moderating the decumulation or accumulation
of financial wealth along the transitional path.
7For reason of space, we restricted ourselves to a rise in gD. Analytical and numerical results after a rise in
government spending falling on gF are available from the author upon request.
8For 21 industrialized economies over 1965-1992, Bayoumi [1999] estimates significant export response elas-
ticities ranging from 0.31 contemporaneously to 0.79 after four years. Since the dynamic system is linearized
around the steady-state, we choose the long-term value.
9For the benchmark parametrization, total consumption expenditure, consumption expenditure, exports, and
net exports as a share of initial GDP are 63%, 53%, 11%, and -2% respectively.
10While empirical studies based on micro data find small values, say falling in the range 0.1-0.4, the real
business cycle literature often sets higher values for σN , say broadly equal to or higher than unity. See e. g. ,
Mankiw and Weinzierl [2006] for a discussion on that subject.
11Standard Keynesian theory predicts that public spending crowds out investment through increases in interest
rates. However, Mountford and Uhlig [2008] who find that empirically “government spending shocks crowd out
both residential and non-residential investment without causing interest rates to rise”, cast doubt over the
standard Keynesian explanation.
12For the sake of analytical simplicity, we abstract from physical capital depreciation in this section and thus
set δK to zero.
13Hemming et al. [2002] review the GDP responses to a fiscal shock across several empirical papers. In
Mountford and Uhlig [2008] and Perotti [2005], the impact spending multiplier falls in a range between 0.2-0.4
over 1960-2000, exception for Germany where the spending multiplier exceeds 1. In line with the results of
Perotti [2005], Corsetti and Mu¨ller [2006] find the reaction of GDP to a fiscal shock is small and only significant
for Australia where GDP increases by 0.42.
14In a previous version of the paper, we conducted a sensitivity analysis with respect to the speed of adjustment
of habits σ. Since government spending multipliers weakly react to a change in σ, we omitted this analysis for
reason of space.
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15See Canzoneri et al. [2007] who suggest several factors like monetary policy explaining the smaller size of
government spending multipliers in the post-1980 period.
16According to numerical results, a rise in trade integration from 10% to 37% implies that c˜D falls by -0.34%
of initial GDP instead of -0.54% if γ = 0.8, and decreases by -0.29% instead of -0.40% if γ = 0. To see it
more formally, differentiate (10) w. r. t. p˜ which yields dc˜/c˜ = ν (1− αc) dp˜/p˜ with ν the long-run IES and
(1− αc) the domestic content in total consumption expenditure. As γ gets closer to unity, the long-run IES ν
takes larger values. Hence, for a given real exchange appreciation, lowering the share of domestic goods (1 − αc)
moderates as much the reduction in real consumption as individuals care more about habits in deriving utility.
Consequently, habits weaken the sensitivity of spending multipliers to trade integration.
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Figure 1: Computed Transitional Paths
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Figure 2: Spending Multipliers: Sensitivity to γ, σN and Trade Openness
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A Preliminary Definitions, Useful Properties and Short-Run
Static Solutions
Preliminaries for Consumption-Side
The instantaneous utility is assumed to take an iso-elastic form:
u (c, s) =
1
1− ²
[ c
sγ
]1−²
. (16)
Partial derivatives are given by :
uc = c−²s−γ(1−²) > 0, (17a)
us = −γc1−²s−[γ(1−²)+1] < 0, (17b)
ucc = −²c−(1+²)s−γ(1−²) < 0, (17c)
uss = γ [γ (1− ²) + 1] c1−²s−[γ(1−²)+2] < 0 i. o. i ² > 1 + γ
γ
, (17d)
ucs = −γ (1− ²) c−²s−[γ(1−²)+1] > 0 i. o. i ² > 1. (17e)
Preliminaries for Production-Side
We denote by :
• βN ≡ − FnFnnn > 0 the absolute value of labor demand elasticity;
• αK ≡ FkkY > 0 the share of output paid out to the capital input and 1− αK ≡ FnnY > 0
the share of output paid out to the labor input;
• σKN ≡ FnFkY Fkn > 0 the substitution elasticity between capital and labor;
• σN = vnvnnn = 1²N > 0 the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor;
• νX = XppX > 0 the elasticity of exports with respect to the real exchange rate.
Useful Properties
Since the production function Y = F (k, n), is assumed to be a linear homogenous produc-
tion function, it possesses the following useful properties:
Fkn = −k
n
Fkk = −n
k
Fnn, (18a)
FkkFnn − F 2kn = 0. (18b)
First-Order Conditions
Denoting by λ and ξ the shadow prices of wealth and habits, the macroeconomic equilibrium
is described by the following set of equations:
uc (c, s) + σξ =
pc (p)λ
p
, (19a)
vn (n) = −λ
p
w, (19b)
Fk = rK + δK , Fn = w, (19c)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (19d)
ξ˙ = (β + σ) ξ − us (c, s) , (19e)
p˙ = p [Fk (k, n)− δK − r?] , (19f)
k˙ = F (k, n)− cD −X (p)− gD − δKk, (19g)
b˙ =
1
p
[
r?pb+ F (k, n)− pc (p) c− I −
(
gD + pgF
)]
, (19h)
1
together with the accumulation equations of habits (4) and physical capital (6) and the transver-
sality conditions:
lim
t→∞ ξs exp (−r
?t) = lim
t→∞ λ¯b exp (−r
?t) = lim
t→∞
λ¯
p
k exp (−r?t) = 0. (20)
Using the fact that w = Fn (k, n), the first-order condition (19b) for labor rewrites as
−vn (n) = λpFn which can be solved for employment n:
n = n
(
λ¯, p, k
)
, (21)
where the partial derivatives are given by
nλ¯ =
∂n
∂λ¯
=
n
λ¯
χ > 0, (22a)
np =
∂n
∂p
= −χn
p
< 0, (22b)
nk =
∂n
∂k
= χ
Fknn
Fn
= χ
n
k
αK
σKN
> 0, (22c)
where we let
χ =
σNβN
σN + βN
> 0. (23)
The market-clearing condition (11) can be solved for investment in physical capital:
I = I
(
λ¯, c, p, k, gD
)
, (24)
where the partial derivatives are given by
Iλ¯ =
∂I
∂λ¯
= Fnnλ¯ =
Y
λ¯
χ (1− αK) > 0, (25a)
Ic =
∂I
∂c
= − (1− αc) pc = −c
D
c
≡ vc < 0, (25b)
Ip =
∂I
∂p
= Fnnp −
(
Xp − pp′′c c
)
= −Y
p
[
χ (1− αK) + X
Y
(
νX +
cD
X
αcφ
)]
< 0, (25c)
Ik =
∂I
∂k
= Fk + Fnnk =
αKY
k
[
1 + χ
(1− αK)
σKN
]
> 0, (25d)
IgD =
∂I
∂gD
= −1 < 0. (25e)
All parameters are defined above and we have computed expression (Xp − pp′′c c) as follows:
Θ ≡ Xp − pp′′c c =
X
p
(
νX +
cD
X
αcφ
)
> 0. (26)
We used the fact that −p′′c pp′c = φ (1− αc) > 0, denoting by φ the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution between the domestic good and the foreign good.
As it will be useful later, we investigate the sign of the following expression by making use
of property (18a):
Fkk + Fknnk = Fkk
(
βN
σN + βN
)
< 0, (27)
and
FkkIp + Fkn [nkIp − (Ik − δK)np]
= np
[
FkkFn − rKFkn
]−Θ(Fkk + Fknnk) > 0. (28)
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Derivation of the Dynamic Equation for Real Consumption
We establish the law of motion of real expenditure along an optimal path. Our aim is
to rewrite the dynamic equation for consumption in a more usual form, making easier the
economic interpretation of analytical results.
By differentiating equation (19a) w. r. t. time, substituting (4) and (19e), and making use
of (19a) to eliminate ξ, we get:
c˙ =
1
ucc
[
(β + σ)
(
uc − pcλ¯
p
)
+ σus − ucsσ (c− s)− pcλ¯
p
(1− αc) p˙
p
]
. (29)
Using the iso-elastic form (16) for utility, we can rewrite (29) as follows:
c˙
c
=
1
²
{
σγ²
(c
s
)
+ σγ (1− ²) + (β + σ)
[
pcλ¯
p
c²sγ(1−²) − 1
]
+
pcλ¯
p
(1− αc) p˙
p
}
. (30)
To rewrite the law of motion of real consumption in a more interpretable form, we calculate
the time preference rate denoted by ρ, defined as the proportional rate of decrease of marginal
utility of real consumption expressed in present value terms (see e. g. Epstein [1987]):
ρ ≡ −d ln {[uc (c, s) + σξ] exp (−βt)}
dt
∣∣∣∣
c˙(t)=0
. (31)
By substituting the accumulation equation for habits (4) and the dynamic equation for its
shadow price (19e), and eliminating ξ by making use of (19a), the rate of time preference
writes as follows:
ρ(t) = β +
p
pcλ
[
σus − ucsσ (c− s) + (β + σ)
(
uc − pcλ
p
)]
. (32)
Using the iso-elastic form (16) for utility we can rewrite (32) as follows:
ρ = β − pc
−²s−γ(1−²)
λ¯pc
{
(β + σ)
(
pcλ
p
c²sγ(1−²) − 1
)
+ σγ²
c
s
+ σγ (1− ²)
}
(33)
By making use of (33), we wan rewrite the temporal path followed by real consumption
(30) as:
c˙ =
c
²
(
1 +
σξ
c−²s−γ(1−²)
)[
r? + (1− αc) p˙
p
− ρ (c, s, p)
]
, (34)
Consumption rises or falls depending on wether the consumption-based real interest rate (the
first term on the RHS in square brackets) is above or below the endogenous time preference
rate (the second term on the RHS). The multiplicative term falls between 0 and 1 (since
c−²s−γ(1−²) = pcλ¯ − σξ > 0). Hence, the relationship between the rate of change of real con-
sumption and the consumption-based real interest rate is smaller than 1/² which corresponds
to the IES with time separable preferences. Consequently, the short-term IES with time non
separable is smaller than the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
B Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions
Some Useful Linearized Expressions
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Useful expressions evaluated at the steady-state denoted by a tilde write as follows:
u˜c +
σ
β + σ
u˜s = c˜−[²+γ(1−²)]
β + σ (1− γ)
β + σ
> 0, (35a)
σ (β + σ)
u˜cc
[
u˜cc +
β + 2σ
β + σ
Γ˜
]
=
σ
²
[γ + ² (1− γ)] [β + σ (1− γ)] > 0, (35b)
−
[
u˜c + σβ+σ u˜s
]
[
u˜cc + β+2σβ+σ Γ˜
]
c˜
= 1/ [γ + ² (1− γ)] , (35c)
− pcλ¯
p˜u˜ccc˜
= −
u˜c + σβ+σ u˜s
u˜ccc˜
=
[β + σ (1− γ)]
² (β + σ)
> 0, (35d)
−σ (β + 2σ)
u˜cc
Γ˜ =
σγ
²
{σ²− (1− ²) [β + σ (1− γ)]} > 0, (35e)[
u˜cc +
β + 2σ
β + σ
Γ˜
]
= −pcλ¯
p˜
[γ + ² (1− γ)] c˜−1 < 0, (35f)
where Γ is given by (37).
We first linearize the time preference rate:
ρ(t) = β +
p˜ucc
pcλ¯
(β + σ) (c(t)− c˜) + p˜
pcλ¯
(β + 2σ) Γ˜ (s(t)− s˜) + (β + σ)
p˜
(p(t)− p˜) (36)
with
Γ = ucs +
σ
β + 2σ
uss > 0. (37)
The sign of Γ depends on the magnitude of the cross partial derivative of the felicity function,
ucs. We assume from now and thereafter that the marginal utility of real consumption is
sufficiently increasing in the reference stock such that the preferences of the representative
agent display adjacent complementarity and Γ is positive (see Ryder and Heal [1973]).
Then, substituting first the dynamic equation for the real exchange rate given by (19f) and
the short-run static solution for labor given by (21), we linearize the dynamic equation for real
consumption (34):
c˙(t) = − λ¯pc
p˜ucc
{
− ρc (c(t)− c˜)− ρs (s(t)− s˜) + (1− αc) [Fkk + Fknnk]
(
k(t)− k˜
)
+ [(1− αc)Fknnp − ρp] (p(t)− p˜)
}
. (38)
Substituting the linearized version of the time preference rate, (38) rewrites as follows:
c˙(t) = (β + σ) (c(t)− c˜) + β + 2σ
ucc
Γ˜ (s(t)− s˜) + λ¯pc
p˜2ucc
(1− αc) [(β + σ)− p˜Fknnp] (p(t)− p˜)
− λ¯pc
p˜ucc
[Fkk + Fknnk]
(
k(t)− k˜
)
, (39)
with
β + 2σ
ucc
Γ˜ = −γ
²
{σ²− (1− ²) [β + σ (1− γ)]} < 0
λ¯pc
p˜ucc
= −c˜ [β + σ (1− γ)]
² (β + σ)
< 0.
Saddle-Point Stability Conditions
Inserting the short-run static solution for labor (21) into the dynamic equations for real
consumption (34) and the real exchange rate (19f), inserting the short-run static solution for
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investment (24) into the accumulation equation of physical capital (6), linearizing these together
with the accumulation equation of habits (4) around the steady-state, and denoting long-term
values by a tilde, we obtain in a matrix form:(
s˙, c˙, k˙, p˙
)T
= J
(
s(t)− s˜, c(t)− c˜, k(t)− k˜, p(t)− p˜
)T
, (40)
where J is given by
J ≡

−σ σ 0 0
β+2σ
u˜cc
Γ β + σ a23 a24
0 I˜c
(
I˜k − δK
)
I˜p
0 0 p˜
[
F˜kk + F˜knn˜k
]
p˜F˜knn˜p
 , (41)
with
a23 = − λ¯pc
p˜u˜cc
(1− αc)
[
F˜kk + F˜knn˜k
]
, (42a)
a24 =
λ¯pc
u˜ccp˜2
(1− αc)
[
(β + σ)− p˜F˜knn˜p
]
, (42b)
and Γ > 0 evaluated at the steady-state is given by (37).
Denoting by µ the eigenvalue, the characteristic equation for the matrix J (41) of the
linearized system writes as follows:
µ4 + b1µ3 + b2µ2 + b3µ+ b4 = 0, (43)
with
b1 = −trJ = −2r? < 0, (44a)
b2 =M2 = (r?)
2 −
{
σ (β + σ)
u˜cc
[
u˜cc +
(
β + 2σ
β + σ
)
Γ˜
]
+ p˜
(
F˜kk + F˜knn˜k
)[
I˜p − I˜c λ¯pc
u˜ccp˜2
(1− αc)
]
− p˜
(
I˜k − δK
)
F˜knn˜p
}
≷ 0 (44b)
b3 = −M3 = r?
{
σ (β + σ)
u˜cc
[
u˜cc +
(
β + 2σ
β + σ
)
Γ˜
]
+ p˜
(
F˜kk + F˜knn˜k
)[
I˜p − I˜c λ¯pc
u˜ccp˜2
(1− αc)
]
− p˜
(
I˜k − δK
)
F˜knn˜p
}
> 0, (44c)
b4 = DetJ =
σ (β + σ) p˜
u˜cc
{[
u˜cc +
(
β + 2σ
β + σ
)
Γ˜
] [
I˜pF˜kk + F˜kn
(
I˜pn˜k − n˜p
(
I˜k − δK
))]
− I˜c λ¯pc
p˜2
(1− αc)
[
F˜kk + F˜knn˜k
]}
> 0, (44d)
where M2 and M3 are respectively the sum of all diagonal second and third order minors of
J (see Dockner and Feichtinger [1991], p. 45). We used the following property (Ik − δK) +
p˜Fknnp = r? to determine (44c).
For the sake of clarity, we drop from now and thereon the tilde over the partial derivatives
evaluated at the steady-state. The positive signs of (44c) and (44d) stems from the following
inequality:
ucc +
σ
β + 2σ
uss < −
(
β + σ
β + 2σ
)
ucc, (45)
Imposing (45) ensures that adjacent complementarity is not too strong and that the dynamic
system exhibits a saddle point stability (see Becker and Murphy [1988]).
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The characteristic polynomial of degree four (43) can be rewritten as a characteristic poly-
nomial of second degree:
θ2 +
b3
r?
θ + b4 with θ = µ (r? − µ) . (46)
By evaluating first the eigenvalues θ from the second order polynomial and then calculating µ
from the definition of θ, the four eigenvalues of the upper-left four by four submatrix in the
Jacobian are given by
µi ≡ 12
r? ±
√√√√√(r?)2 + 2
 b3
r?
±
√(
b3
r?
)2
− 4b4

 , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, (47)
with
µ1 < µ2 < 0 < r? < µ3 < µ4. (48)
and having the following properties
r? − µ1 = µ4, r? − µ2 = µ3. (49)
The determinant of the matrix given by (44d) is positive, i. e. b4 > 0. This is consistent
with there being either 2 negative and 2 positive roots, 4 positive, or 4 negative roots. Since
the trace of the matrix J is equal to 2r? = −b1 which is positive and the trace is equal to the
sum of eigenvalues, only the first two cases must be considered. By Descartes rule of signs,
necessary and sufficient conditions for the characteristic equation to have just two positive
roots is that either b2 < 0 or b3 > 0. From (44c), b3 > 0 so we can exclude the case of four
positive roots. Since the system features two state variables, s and k, and two jump variables,
c and p, the equilibrium yields a unique stable saddle-path.
Following Dockner and Feichtinger [1991], the necessary and sufficient conditions for saddle-
point stability with real roots are:
b3
r?
> 0, (50a)
0 < 4b4 ≤
(
b3
r?
)2
. (50b)
The first condition (50a) holds if the inequality (44c) is fulfilled. Expression
(
b3
r?
)2 − 4b4 can
be rewritten as:(
b3
r?
)2
− 4b4 =
{
σ (β + σ)
ucc
[
ucc +
(
β + 2σ
β + σ
)
Γ˜
]
− p˜
[
(Fkk + Fknnk)
(
Ip − Ic λ¯pc
uccp˜2
(1− αc)
)
− (Ik − δK)Fknnp
]}2
− 4σ (β + 2σ) Γ˜
ucc
Ic
λ¯pc
uccp˜
(1− αc) (Fkk + Fknnk) R 0. (51)
As the second condition may quite plausibly not hold, the system (41) exhibits saddle-point
behavior (as we have shown previously) but the stable roots may be either real or complex.
In the former case, trajectories may be monotonic or humped. Hence, in the latter case, the
dynamics involve cyclical behavior.
Formal Solutions
Setting the constants A3 = A4 = 0 to insure a converging adjustment for all macroeconomic
aggregates, the stable paths are given by:
s(t)− s˜ = A1eµ1t +A2eµ2t, (52a)
c(t)− c˜ = ω12A1eµ1t + ω22A2eµ2t, (52b)
k(t)− k˜ = ω13A1eµ1t + ω23A2eµ2t, (52c)
p(t)− p˜ = ω14A1eµ1t + ω24A2eµ2t, (52d)
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where the eigenvectors ωij associated with eigenvalue µi are given by
ωi2 =
(
σ + µi
σ
)
, (53a)
ωi3 =
(p˜Fknnp − µi) Ic (σ + µi)
σ {(r? − µi)µi + p˜ {IpFkk + Fkn [Ipnk − (Ik − δK)np]}} , (53b)
ωi4 = −
p˜ (Fkk + Fknnk)
(p˜Fknnp − µi) ω
i
3, (53c)
where we used the fact that Fnnk+pFknnp = 0. We normalized ωi1 to unity. The two constants
write as follows:
A1 =
dk˜ − ω23ds˜
ω23 − ω13
, A2 =
ω13ds˜− dk˜
ω23 − ω13
. (54)
To determine the signs of eigenvectors, we have to establish the signs of useful expressions.
The first one is straightforward:
b3
r?
>
√(
b3
r?
)2
− 4b4 > 0. (55)
This inequality holds while the eigenvalues are real.
Making use of (49), we can establish some conditions for the signs of the following expres-
sions:
µ1µ4 + p˜ {IpFkk + Fkn [Ipnk − (Ik − δK)np]} ≶ 0,
depending on wether p˜ {IpFkk + Fkn [Ipnk − (Ik − δK)np]} ≶ σ (β + σ) , (56a)
µ2µ3 + p˜ {IpFkk + Fkn [Ipnk − (Ik − δK)np]} ≷ 0,
depending on wether p˜ {IpFkk + Fkn {[Ipnk − (Ik − δK)np]} ≷ σ (β + σ) , (56b)
Since for plausible (and a large range of) values of preferences and production-side parameters,
inequality 0 < p˜ [IpFkk + Fkn (Ipnk − (Ik − δK)np)] < σ (β + σ) holds, we deduce that µ1µ4 +
p˜ [IpFkk + Fkn (Ipnk − (Ik − δK)np)] < 0 and µ2µ3 + p˜ [IpFkk + Fkn (Ipnk − (Ik − δK)np)] < 0
(see inequality (56a)).
In light of the above, we assume that 0 < p˜ {IpFkk + Fkn [Ipnk − (Ik − δK)np]} < σ (β + σ)
which implies in turn:
(r? − µ1)µ1 + p˜ {IpFkk + Fkn [Ipnk − (Ik − δK)np]}
= µ4µ1 + p˜ {IpFkk + Fkn [Ipnk − (Ik − δK)np]} < 0, (57a)
(r? − µ2)µ2 + p˜ {IpFkk + Fkn [Ipnk − (Ik − δK)np]}
= µ3µ2 + p˜ {IpFkk + Fkn [Ipnk − (Ik − δK)np]} < 0. (57b)
In addition, the sign of eigenvector (σ + µ1) can be established as follows:
(σ + µ1) ≷ 0 depending on wether p˜ {IpFkk + Fkn [Ipnk − (Ik − δK)np]} ≶ σ (β + σ) .
(58)
Imposing the inequality has the following implications for eigenvectors ω12 and ω
2
2:
(σ + µ1) > 0, (σ + µ2) > 0 if p˜ {IpFkk + Fkn [Ipnk − (Ik − δK)np]} < σ (β + σ) , (59)
where it is straightforward to infer that (σ + µ2) > 0 since µ1 < µ2 < 0.
An another way to show that the eigenvector ωi2 is positive is to use the second line of
(J − µiI4×4)ωij = 0 which allows to derive another expression of ωi2:
ωi2 = −
β+2σ
u˜cc
Γ˜ + λ¯pc
p˜2ucc
(1− αc) (β + σ − µi)ωi4
(β + σ − µi) > 0, i = 1, 2, (60)
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where we used the fact that ωi3 = − (p˜Fknnp−µi)p˜(Fkk+Fknnk) and we estimated the following expression (see
(42a)-(42b)):
a24 − a23 (p˜Fknnp − µi)
p˜ (Fkk + Fknnk)
=
λ¯pc
p˜2ucc
(1− αc) (β + σ − µi) < 0, i = 1, 2.
From expression (60), it is straightforward to show that ωi2 > 0 for i = 1, 2 as long as ω
i
4 > 0,
by making use of properties (49).
Signs of Eigenvectors
We write out the four eigenvectors ωi, corresponding with stable eigenvalues µi with i = 1, 2,
to determine their signs
ω1 =

1 (+)(σ+µ1
σ
)
(+)
(p˜Fknnp−µ1)Ic(σ+µ1)
σ{(r?−µ1)µ1+p˜{IpFkk+Fkn[Ipnk−(Ik−δK)np]}} (?)
− p˜(Fkk+Fknnk)Ic(σ+µ1)σ{(r?−µ1)µ1+p˜{IpFkk+Fkn[Ipnk−(Ik−δK)np]}} (+)
 , (61)
where the sign of (p˜Fknnp − µ1) is undetermined, similarly to the case of time separable pref-
erences.
ω2 =

1 (+)(σ+µ2
σ
)
(+)
(p˜Fknnp−µ2)Ic(σ+µ2)
σ{(r?−µ2)µ2+p˜{IpFkk+Fkn[Ipnk−(Ik−δK)np]}} (?)
− p˜(Fkk+Fknnk)Ic(σ+µ2)σ{(r?−µ2)µ2+p˜{IpFkk+Fkn[Ipnk−(Ik−δK)np]}} (+)
 , (62)
where the sign of and (p˜Fknnp − µ2) is undetermined, similarly to the case of time separable
preferences.
Formal Solution for Labor
To compute the formal solution for labor, we linearize the short-run static solution (21) for
labor around the steady-state:
n(t)− n˜ = np (p(t)− p˜) + nk
(
k(t)− k˜
)
. (63)
Substituting the stable solutions for p(t) and k(t), we get:
n(t)− n˜ = L1A1eµ1t + L2A2eµ2t, (64)
with
L1 = nkω13 + npω
1
4, (65a)
L2 = nkω23 + npω
2
4. (65b)
Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Assets
The accumulation equation for traded bonds is:
b˙(t) = r?b(t) +
X (p(t))
p(t)
− p′c (p(t)) c(t)− gF . (66)
We first linearize equation (66) around the steady-state:
b˙(t) = r?
(
b(t)− b˜
)
+ Ω˜ (p(t)− p˜)− p′c (p˜) (c(t)− c˜) (67)
with
Ω˜ ≡ 1
p˜
[
X˜
p˜
(ν˜X − 1) + c˜F ν˜F
]
=
1
p˜
[
Θ− X˜
p˜
]
> 0, (68)
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where the elasticities of exports and imports w. r. t. the real exchange rate are:
νX =
Xpp
X
> 0, νF = −p
′′
cp
cF
= φ (1− αc) > 0. (69)
Expression (68) gives the net exports reaction expressed in terms of the foreign good to a
change in the real exchange rate. We assume that the generalized version of the Marshall-
Lerner condition, i. e. with an unbalanced trade balance, holds. Hence, a rise in the relative
price of import goods leads to an improvement of the trade balance evaluated at the steady-
state, so we set Ω˜ > 0.
Inserting stable solutions for c(t) and p(t), given respectively by (52b) and (52d), the
solution for the current account writes as follows (we set A3 = A4 = 0 to eliminate unstable
paths):
b˙(t) = r?
(
b(t)− b˜
)
+ Ω˜
2∑
i=1
Aiω
i
4e
µit − p′c
2∑
i=1
Aiω
i
2e
µit (70)
Solving the differential equation yields:
b(t)− b˜ =
[(
b0 − b˜
)
− N1A1
µ1 − r? −
N2A2
µ2 − r?
]
er
?t
+
N1A1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
N2A2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t, (71)
where
N1 = Ω˜ω14 − p′cω12, N2 = Ω˜ω24 − p′cω22. (72)
Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency given by (20), we obtain
the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint:
b0 − b˜ = N1A1
µ1 − r? +
N2A2
µ2 − r? . (73)
For the national intertemporal solvency to hold, the terms in brackets of equation (71) must
be null, such that the stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to
b(t)− b˜ = N1A1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
N2A2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t. (74)
Inserting the values for the constants A1 and A2 given by equations (54), we obtain the
linearized version of the national intertemporal budget constraint expressed as a function of
initial stocks of capital and habits:
b˜− b0 = Φ1
(
k˜ − k0
)
+Φ2 (s˜− s0) , (75)
with
Φ1 =
(µ1 − r?)N2 − (µ2 − r?)N1
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)
(
ω23 − ω13
) , (76a)
Φ2 =
(µ2 − r?)ω23N1 − (µ1 − r?)ω13N2
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)
(
ω23 − ω13
) . (76b)
Formal Solution for the Stock of Financial Wealth
Financial wealth measured in terms of the domestic good, a(t), is equal to the sum of the
stock of foreign assets, p(t)b(t), measured in terms of the foreign good and the capital stock.
The law of motion for financial wealth (S(t) = a˙(t)) is given by:
a˙(t) = rK(t)a(t) + w(t)n(t)− pc (p(t)) c− T, (77)
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where lump-sump taxes cover overall government spending, i. e. T = gD+pgF . Remembering
that w = Fn and rK = Fk − δK and substituting the short-run static solution for labor
n
(
λ¯, p, k,
)
, linearizing (77) in the neighborhood of the steady-state, we get:
a˙(t) = r? (a(t)− a˜) +
[
(Fkk + Fknnk) p˜b˜+ Fnnk
] (
k(t)− k˜
)
− pc (c(t)− c˜)
+
[(
Fknp˜b˜+ Fn
)
np −
(
c˜F + gF
)]
(p(t)− p˜) , (78)
where we used the fact that r˜K ≡ Fk − δK = r? at the steady-state; we used properties
(18) and a ≡ pb + k to rewrite (Fkk + Fknnk) a˜ + (Fkn + Fnnnk) n˜ and Fknnpa˜ + Fnnnpn˜ as
(Fkk + Fknnk) p˜b˜ and Fknnpp˜b˜ respectively.
By inserting the stable solutions, using the fact that ωi3 = − (p˜Fknnp−µi)p˜(Fkk+Fknnk)ωi4, and rearranging
terms, the solution for the stock of financial wealth writes as follows:
a˙(t) = r? (a(t)− a˜)−
2∑
i=1
[
(r? − µi) b˜+ X˜
p˜
+
Fnnk
p˜ (Fkk + Fknnk)
(
FkkFn
Fkn
− µi
)]
ωi4Aie
µit
− pc
2∑
i=1
Aiω
i
2e
µit, (79)
where we used the fact that
(
c˜F + gF
)
= r?b˜+ X˜p˜ .
Solving the differential equation leads to:
a(t)− a˜ =
[
(a0 − a˜)− S1A1
µ1 − r? −
S2A2
µ2 − r?
]
er
?t +
S1A1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
S2A2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t, (80)
where
S1 = −
[
µ4b˜+
X˜
p˜
+
Fnnk
p˜ (Fkk + Fknnk)
(
FkkFn
Fkn
− µ1
)]
ω14 − pcω12 < 0, (81a)
S2 = −
[
µ3b˜+
X˜
p˜
+
Fnnk
p˜ (Fkk + Fknnk)
(
FkkFn
Fkn
− µ2
)]
ω24 − pcω22 < 0, (81b)
with (Fkk + Fknnk) < 0 and nk > 0, and eigenvectors ω14, ω
2
4, ω
1
2, ω
2
2 are positive for all
parametrization.
Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, we get the linearized ver-
sion of the households’ intertemporal budget constraint:
a0 − a˜ = S1A1
µ1 − r? +
S2A2
µ2 − r? . (82)
For the intertemporal solvency to hold, the terms in brackets of equation (82) must be null, so
as the stable solution for the stock of financial wealth finally reduces to:
a(t)− a˜ = S1A1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
S2A2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t. (83)
Formal Solution for GDP
Linearize the production function in the neighborhood of the steady-state:
Y (t) = Y˜ + Fk
(
k(t)− k˜
)
+ Fn (n(t)− n˜) .
Remembering that Fk = r?+ δK , and using expressions of L1 and L2 given by (65), the stable
solution for overall output writes as follows:
Y (t) = Y˜ + Yk
(
k(t)− k˜
)
+ Yp (p(t)− p˜) ,
= Y˜ + Yk
2∑
i=1
ωi3Aie
µit + Yp
2∑
i=1
ωi4Aie
µit, (84)
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with
Yk = (r? + δK) + Fnnk = Ik > 0, Yp = Fnnp < 0. (85)
C Steady-State Changes of Government Spending Shocks
The steady-state of the economy is obtained by setting c˙, s˙, k˙, p˙, b˙ = 0 and is defined by the
following set of equations:
uc (c˜, s˜) +
σ
β + σ
us (c˜, s˜) =
pc (p˜) λ¯
p˜
, (86a)
c˜ = s˜, (86b)
r? + δK = Fk
[
k˜, n
(
λ¯, p˜, k˜
)]
, (86c)
r?p˜b˜+ F
[
k˜, n
(
λ¯, p˜, k˜
)]
− pc (p˜) c˜− δK k˜ − gD − p˜gF = 0, (86d)
F
[
k˜, n
(
λ¯, p˜, k˜
)]
= (1− αc) pc (p˜) c˜+ δK k˜ +X (p˜) + gD, (86e)
and the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint(
b˜− b0
)
= Φ1
(
k˜ − k0
)
+Φ2 (s˜− s0) , (86f)
where we used the fact that at steady-state I˜ = δK k˜, and we have substituted the short-run
static solution for labor which obviously holds in the long-term.
C.1 Steady-State Changes
Totally differentiating equations (86) yields in matrix form:
[
ucc +
(
β+2σ
β+σ
)
Γ˜
]
pcλ¯(1−αc)
p˜2
−pcp˜ 0 0
0 Fknnp Fknnλ¯ Fkk + Fknnk 0
−pc
(
Ip + p˜Ω˜
)
Iλ¯ (Ik − δK) p˜r?
− (1− αc) pc Ip Iλ¯ (Ik − δK) 0
−Φ2 0 0 −Φ1 1


dc˜
dp˜
dλ¯
dk˜
db˜

=

0
0
dgD + p˜dgF
dgD
db0 − Φ1dk0 − Φ2ds0
 . (87)
We used the fact that
(
c˜F + gF − r?b˜
)
= X˜/p˜ (see (89)) together with Fnnp = Ip + Θ˜ and
p˜Ω˜ = Θ˜− X˜/p˜ to rewrite
(
Fnnp − X˜p˜
)
as follows
(
Ip + p˜Ω˜
)
.
Domestic Good gD
The steady-state effects of an unanticipated permanent increase in government expenditure
falling on the domestic good are obtained from the total differential of the equilibrium system
11
(86) w. r. t. gD:
dc˜
dgD
=
ds˜
dgD
=
pc
D
(Fkk + Fknnk) Ω˜− r
?pcαc
D
Φ1Fknnp < 0, (88a)
dp˜
dgD
=
Fknnλ¯
D
[
ucc +
β + 2σ
β + σ
Γ
]
r?p˜Φ1 − (Fkk + Fknnk)
D
pc
p˜
(p˜r?Φ2 − αcpc) ≶ 0, (88b)
dλ¯
dgD
= −(Fkk + Fknnk)
D
pcλ¯ (1− αc)
p˜2
(p˜r?Φ2 − αcpc)
−
[
ucc + β+2σβ+σ Γ
]
D
[
Fknnpr
?p˜Φ1 − p˜Ω˜ (Fkk + Fknnk)
]
≷ 0, (88c)
dk˜
dgD
= −Fkn
D
nλ¯
[
ucc +
β + 2σ
β + σ
Γ
]
p˜Ω˜
+
Fkn
D′
np
αcpc
p˜
(Φ2r?p˜− αcpc) = (+)(+) +
(+)
(+)
> 0, (88d)
db˜
dgD
= Φ1
dk˜
dgD
+Φ2
ds˜
dgD
< 0, (88e)
where Φ1 < 0, Φ2 > 0, (Φ2r?p˜− αcpc) < 0 and D > 0 for all parametrization.
Totally differentiating the short-run static solution for labor (21) and substituting relevant
expressions (88), the steady-state change of employment after a permanent rise in gD is:
dn˜
dgD
= nλ¯
dλ¯
dgD
+ np
dp˜
dgD
+ nk
dk˜
dgD
,
= −Fkk
D
{
−
[
ucc +
β + 2σ
β + σ
Γ˜
]
nλ¯p˜Ω˜ +
pc
p˜
αcnp (Φ2r?p˜− αcpc)
}
> 0,
= −Fkkχn˜
D
(
pc
p˜
)2
[γ + ² (1− γ)] X˜
pcc˜
[
νX +
p˜c˜F
X˜
(αcν + (1− αc)φ)− 1
]
+
Fkkχn˜
D
c˜F
c˜
r?Φ2 > 0, (89)
where the sign of (89) comes from assumption (Φ2r?p˜− αcpc) < 0. As long as this inequality
holds, and thereby labor rises, as longer as a fall in real consumption by one unit induces an
improvement in the balance of trade by a larger size than the fall in interest receipts.
Import Good gF
The steady-state effects of an unanticipated permanent increase in government expenditure
falling on the foreign good are obtained from the total differential of the equilibrium system
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(86) w. r. t. to gF :
dc˜
dgF
=
ds˜
dgF
= −pc
D
{
−Θ˜ (Fkk + Fknnk) + αcnp [FkkFn − Fknr?]
}
= −(+)
(+)
< 0, (90a)
dp˜
dgF
=
p˜
D
[
ucc +
β + 2σ
β + σ
Γ
]
[FkkIλ¯ + Fkn (nkIλ¯ − nλ¯ (Ik − δK))]
−(pc)
2
D
(1− αc) (Fkk + Fknnk) > 0, (90b)
dλ¯
dgF
= − p˜ (Fkk + Fknnk)
D
[
(1− αc) pc
p˜
]2
λ¯
−
[
ucc + β+2σβ+σ Γ
]
D
p˜ [(Fkk + Fknnk) Ip − Fknnp (Ik − δK)] > 0, (90c)
dk˜
dgF
=
Fkn
D
{
−
[
ucc +
β + 2σ
β + σ
Γ
]
nλ¯p˜Θ˜ + p
2
c (1− αc)αcnp
}
,
=
Fknχn˜
D
pc
p˜
[γ + ² (1− γ)] X˜
c˜
[
νX + αc
c˜D
X˜
(φ− ν)
]
> 0, (90d)
db˜
dgF
= Φ1
dk˜
dgF
+Φ2
ds˜
dgF
< 0, (90e)
where Φ1 < 0 and Φ2 > 0 and D > 0 for all parametrization. We used the fact that
{FkkIλ¯ + Fkn [nkIλ¯ − nλ¯ (Ik − δK)]} = nλ¯ (FkkFn − Fknr?) < 0 to compute the sign of (90b).
The sign of (90d) holds, i. e. the capital stock is permanently raised after a rise in government
spending in gF , if φ > ν, that is if the long-term IES with time non separable preferences is
less than the intratemporal elasticity of substitution φ. As empirical evidence overwhelmingly
suggest, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is smaller that unity, i. e.
ν < 1; additionally, since domestic and foreign goods are substitutes, we set φ > 1; hence, the
inequality φ > ν holds.
Totally differentiating the short-run static solution for labor (21) and substituting relevant
expressions (90), the steady-state change of employment after a permanent rise in gF is:
dn˜
dgF
= nλ¯
dλ¯
dgF
+ np
dp˜
dgF
+ nk
dk˜
dgF
,
= −Fkkχn˜
D
(pc)
2
p˜
[γ + ² (1− γ)] X˜
pcc˜
[
νX + αc
c˜D
X˜
(φ− ν)
]
> 0. (91)
The sign of (91) holds, i. e. employment is permanently raised after a rise in gF as long as the
inequality φ > ν is fulfilled.
C.2 Wealth Effect and Direct Effect: The Two-Step Solution Procedure
In this section, we calculate the signs of the partial derivatives of the steady-state functions
obtained in the first step of the two-step solution procedure by solving system (86a)-(86e) with-
out the intertemporal budget constraint (86f). Totally differentiating the system of equations
(86a)-(86e) yields in matrix form:
[
ucc +
(
β+2σ
β+σ
)
Γ
]
pcλ¯(1−αc)
p˜2
0 0
0 Fknnp Fkk + Fknnk 0
−pc
(
Ip + p˜Ω˜
)
(Ik − δK) p˜r?
− (1− αc) pc Ip (Ik − δK) 0


dc˜
dp˜
dk˜
db˜

=

pc
p˜ dλ¯
−Fknnλ¯dλ¯
dgD + p˜dgF − Iλ¯dλ¯
dgD − Iλ¯dλ¯
 . (92)
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The determinant of the system matrix is given by:
G ≡ p˜r?
[
ucc +
(
β + 2σ
β + σ
)
Γ˜
]
{FkkIp + Fkn [nkIp − (Ik − δK)np]}
+p˜r?
[
pc (1− αc)
p˜
]2
(Fkk + Fknnk) λ¯ < 0, (93)
where the sign of G follows from (26) and (27).
From system (92), we can calculate the partial derivatives of the following steady-state
functions:
k˜ = k
(
λ¯, gD, gF
)
, (94a)
s˜ = c˜ = m
(
λ¯, gD, gF
)
, (94b)
p˜ = p
(
λ¯, gD, gF
)
, (94c)
b˜ = v
(
λ¯, gD, gF
)
, (94d)
with
mλ¯ ≡
∂c˜
∂λ¯
=
pcr
?
G
{
{FkkIp + Fkn [nkIp − (Ik − δK)np]}
+
1
G
λ¯ (1− αc)
p˜
{FkkIλ¯ + Fkn [nkIλ¯ − nλ¯ (Ik − δK)]}
}
< 0, (95a)
mgD ≡
∂c˜
∂gD
= −r
?
G
pcλ¯ (1− αc)
p˜
(Fkk + Fknnk) =
(+)
(−) < 0, (95b)
mgF ≡
∂c˜
∂gF
= 0, (95c)
pλ¯ ≡
∂p˜
∂λ¯
= −
[
ucc +
(
β+2σ
β+σ
)
Γ
]
G
r?p˜ [(Fkk + Fknnk) Iλ¯ − Fknnλ¯ (Ik − δK)]
+
r?
G
(1− αc) (pc)2 (Fkk + Fknnk) = (−)(−) +
(−)
(−) > 0, (95d)
pgD ≡
∂p˜
∂gD
=
[
ucc +
(
β+2σ
β+σ
)
Γ
]
G
r?p˜ (Fkk + Fknnk) =
(+)
(−) < 0, (95e)
pgF ≡
∂p˜
∂gF
= 0, (95f)
kλ¯ ≡
∂k˜
∂λ¯
=
r?p˜Fkn
G
{[
ucc +
(
β + 2σ
β + σ
)
Γ
]
nλ¯Θ˜−
p2c (1− αc)
p˜
αcnp
}
> 0, (95g)
kgD ≡
∂k˜
∂gD
= −r
?p˜
G
Fknnp
[
ucc +
(
β + 2σ
β + σ
)
Γ
]
=
(−)
(−) > 0, (95h)
kgF ≡
∂k˜
∂gF
= 0, (95i)
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where the signs follow from several expressions which have been computed:
{FkkIp + Fkn [nkIp − (Ik − δK)np]}+ λ¯ (1− αc)
p˜
{FkkIλ¯ + Fkn [nkIλ¯ − nλ¯ (Ik − δK)]}
= −Θ˜ (Fkk + Fknnk) + αcnp [FkkFn − Fknr?] > 0, (96a)
npIλ¯ − nλ¯Ip = nλ¯Θ˜ > 0, (96b)
np + (1− αc) λ¯
p˜
nλ¯ = αcnp < 0, (96c)[
ucc +
(
β + 2σ
β + σ
)
Γ
]
nλ¯Θ˜−
p2c (1− αc)
p˜
αcnp
=
pc
p˜
[γ + ² (1− γ)]
c˜
npX˜
[
νX + αc
c˜D
X˜
(φ− ν)
]
< 0, (96d)
[(Fkk + Fknnk) Iλ¯ − Fknnλ¯ (Ik − δK)] = nλ¯ [FkkFn − Fknr?] < 0, (96e)
To determine the sign of (96a), we used the fact that (Ik − δK) = (Fk − δK)+Fnnk = r?+Fnnk
at the steady-state. The sign of (96d) holds as long as φ > ν, i. e. if the long-term IES with
time non separable preferences is smaller than the intratemporal elasticity of substitution φ.
Substituting the steady-state function for the capital stock (94a) and the real exchange rate
(94c) into the static solution for employment (21), the long-term level of labor can be expressed
in terms of marginal utility of wealth and exogenous policy parameters:
n˜ = N
(
λ¯, gD, gF
)
, (97)
where partial derivatives are given by:
Nλ¯ ≡
∂n˜
∂λ¯
= − p˜r
?nλ¯
G
[
ucc +
(
β + 2σ
β + σ
)
Γ
] [
FkkΘ˜ + (1− αc)np (FkkFn − Fknr?)
]
+
npFkkr
?
G
p2c (1− αc)αc ≷ 0, (98a)
NgD ≡
∂n˜
∂gD
=
npp˜r
?Fkk
G
[
ucc +
(
β + 2σ
β + σ
)
Γ
]
> 0, (98b)
NgF ≡
∂n˜
∂gF
= 0. (98c)
C.3 Short-Term Effects of a Fiscal Expansion: The Case of Inelastic Labor
The derivation of trajectories turn out to be quite complex in the case of elastic labor. By
contrast, as long as employment is fixed, we are able to fully characterize transitional dynamics.
In this subsection, we characterize the transitional dynamics by assuming that labor is fixed
for analytical simplicity. Yet, tt is worthwhile noticing that the results derived in the case of
inelastic labor hold with elastic labor.
We start the investigation of transitional dynamics by evaluating the constants after a
government spending shock, gj (with j = D,F ):
A1
dgj
= − ω
2
3
ω23 − ω13
ds˜
dgj
> 0, j = D,F, (99a)
A2
dgj
=
ω13
ω23 − ω13
ds˜
dgj
< 0, j = D,F, (99b)
where ω13 > 0, ω
2
3 > 0, ds˜/dg
j < 0.
From (99), we deduce the following property:
A2
dgj
= −ω
1
3
ω23
A1
dgj
, j = D,F. (100)
15
Setting t = 0 into (52d), differentiating with respect to gD, and noting that dk˜dgD = 0, the
real exchange rate appreciates initially following an unanticipated permanent rise in government
spending on the domestic good:
dp(0)
dgD
=
dp˜
dgD
+ ω14
A1
dgD
+ ω24
A2
dgD
,
=
dp˜
dgD
+
[
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
ω23 − ω13
]
ds˜
dgD
,
= −Fkk
D
pc
p˜
{
(p˜r?Φ2 − αcpc) +
[
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
ω23 − ω13
](
Ip +
X˜
p˜
)}
< 0. (101)
Then, we derive the initial reactions of investment and the rate of change of the real
exchange rate:
dk˙(0)
dgD
= µ1ω13
A1
dgD
+ µ2ω23
A2
dgD
,
=
[
ω13ω
2
3
ω23 − ω13
]
(µ2 − µ1) ds˜dgD < 0, (102a)
dp˙(0)
dgD
= µ1ω14
A1
dgD
+ µ2ω24
A2
dgD
,
= −
[
µ1ω
1
4ω
2
3 − µ2ω24ω13
ω23 − ω13
]
ds˜
dgD
= 0. (102b)
We investigate in more details the condition of the non-monotonic adjustment of the invest-
ment in physical capital. More specifically, we must determine wether there exists a critical
value of time, t = tˆ > 0, such that investment , i. e. I
(
tˆ
)
= k˙
(
tˆ
)
= 0. Setting the time
derivative of the stable solution of physical capital at zero, and solving for tˆ yields:
tˆ =
1
µ1 − µ2 ln
[
−µ2ω
2
3A2/dg
D
µ1ω13A1/dgD
]
, (103)
where µ1 − µ2 < 0 and the necessary condition for tˆ > 0 corresponds to:
0 < −µ2ω
2
3A2/dg
D
µ1ω13A1/dgD
< 1 ⇔ dk˙(0)
dgD
< 0. (104)
If condition (104) holds, the stock of physical capital initially decreases before reaching a
turning point at time tˆ. Subsequently, investment is crowded-in and the stock of capital goods
increases towards its unchanged steady-state level (because we assumed that labor supply is
inelastic).
Regarding the transitional path followed by the real exchange rate, it is convenient to
rewrite the time derivative of its stable solution by using the fact that ωi4 =
p˜Fkk
µi
ωi3:
p˙(t) = −p˜Fkkω13
A1
dgD
dgD
(
1− e(µ1−µ2)t
)
eµ2t > 0. (105)
To sum up, after a rise in gD, the relative price of the foreign good jumps initially downward
and then the real exchange rate depreciates along a stable monotonic transitional path.
We have now to derive the initial reaction of the current account. At this end, we differenti-
ate the two-dimensional stable solution for b(t) w. r. t. time, evaluate at t = 0 and differentiate
w. r. t. gj (with j = D,F ):
db˙(0)
dgj
= µ1
N1
µ1 − r?
A1
dgj
+ µ2
N2
µ2 − r?
A2
dgj
= −
[
µ1 (µ2 − r?)ω23N1 − µ2 (µ1 − r?)ω13N2
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)
(
ω23 − ω13
) ] ds˜
dgj
, j = D,F (106)
= −(−)
(+)
× (−) < 0,
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where used the fact that
(
ω23 − ω13
)
> 0. From (106), the current account unambiguously
deteriorates at time t = 0.
To investigate in more details the conditions under which the stock of foreign bonds adjusts
non monotonically, we have to determine wether there exists a critical value of time, denoted
by t = t˜ > 0, such that the stock of traded bonds reaches a turning point along the stable
trajectory, i. e. ca
(
t˜
)
= b˙
(
t˜
)
= 0. Setting the time derivative of the stable solution of traded
bonds equal to zero and solving for t˜, we get:
t˜ =
1
µ1 − µ2 ln
[
−µ2 (µ1 − r
?)N2A2/dgj
µ1 (µ2 − r?)N1A1/dgj
]
, (107)
where N1 < 0 for all parametrization and N2 ≷ 0. In the case N2 > 0, the critical value of
time along the transitional path does not exist since the term in square brackets is negative.
Since N2 is positive for all parametrization, the current account stays in deficit along entire
adjustment.
Setting t = 0 into the stable solution of real consumption, differentiating with respect to
gj , and substituting constants given by (99), we obtain the initial response of real consumption
following an unanticipated permanent rise in government spending:
dc(0)
dgj
=
dc˜
dgj
+
(
σ + µ1
σ
)
A1
dgj
+
(
σ + µ2
σ
)
A2
dgj
= −
[
µ1ω
2
3 − µ2ω13
σ
(
ω23 − ω13
) ] dc˜
dgj
= −(−)
(+)
× (−) < 0, j = D,F (108)
where ω23 − ω13 > 0 and µ1ω23 − µ2ω13 < 0 (after tedious computations).
Regarding real consumption’s transitional path, there exists a critical value of time, t =
t˘ > 0, such that the real consumption reaches a turning point, i. e. c˙
(
t˘
)
= 0. Setting the time
derivative of the stable solution of consumption equal to zero and solving for t˘, we get:
t˘ =
1
µ1 − µ2 ln
[
−µ2ω
2
2A2/dg
j
µ1ω12A1/dgj
]
, (109)
where µ1 − µ2 < 0 and the necessary condition for t˘ > 0 corresponds to:
0 < −µ2ω
2
2A2/dg
j
µ1ω12A1/dgj
< 1 ⇔ dc˙(0)
dgj
< 0. (110)
If condition (110) holds, real consumption initially decreases before reaching a turning point
at time t˘. Subsequently, the real consumption rises towards its new lower long-run level.
Then, we investigate in more details the condition of the non-monotonic adjustment of the
reference stock. Adopting the same procedure than previously, there exists a critical value of
time, t = t´ > 0, such that the habit stock reaches a turning point, i. e. s˙
(
t´
)
= s˙
(
t´
)
= 0.
Setting the time derivative of the stable solution of the reference stock equal to zero and solving
for t´, we get:
t´ =
1
µ1 − µ2 ln
[
−µ2A2/dg
j
µ1A1/dgj
]
, (111)
where µ1 − µ2 < 0 and the necessary condition for t´ > 0 corresponds to:
0 < −µ2A2/dg
j
µ1A1/dgj
< 1 ⇔ ds˙(0)
dgj
< 0. (112)
If condition (112) holds, the stock of habits initially decreases before reaching a turning point
at time t´. Subsequently, accumulation of habits turns to be positive and the reference stock
increases towards its new lower steady-state level, i. e. s overshoots its long-term value.
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C.4 The Short-Term and Long-Term Marginal Propensities to Consume
with Habits
In this subsection, we provide the main steps of derivation of the short-run and long-run
marginal propensities to consume (MPC). The fact that stable paths are two-dimensional
complicate substantially the derivation of MPC. Hence, we found convenient to simplify the
model by abstracting from capital accumulation.
Households maximize the following objective function:
U =
∫ ∞
0
{
1
1− ²
[
c(t)
(s(t))γ
]1−²
− γN n(t)
1+²N
1 + ²N
}
exp (−βt) dt, (113)
subject to the flow budget constraint
p(t)b˙(t) = r?p(t)b(t) + w(t)n(t)− pcc− T, (114)
and the accumulation equation of habits (4). The government finances government spending
on the domestic good g by levying lump-sum taxes T .
Macroeconomic Equilibrium
The macroeconomic equilibrium is described by the following set of equations:
uc (c, s) + σξ =
pcλ
p
, (115a)
vn (n) = −λ
p
w, (115b)
Fn (n) = w, (115c)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (115d)
ξ˙ = (β + σ) ξ − us (c, s) , (115e)
F (n) = (1− αc) pcc+X (p) + g, (115f)
together with the accumulation equation of foreign assets (180), the accumulation equation of
habits (4) and appropriate transversality conditions; (1− αc) pcc stands for the consumption
in the domestic good.
Solving (115b) for labor yields n = n
(
λ¯, p
)
. Substituting the short-run static solution for
labor into the market-clearing condition for the home good (115f) and solving for the real
exchange rate yields:
p = Π
(
λ¯, c, gD
)
, (116)
where
Πλ¯ ≡ −
Fnnλ¯
Fnnp −Θ > 0, (117a)
Πc ≡ (1− αc) pc
Fnnp −Θ < 0, (117b)
ΠgD ≡
1
Fnnp −Θ < 0, (117c)
with Θ ≡ Xp
(
ηX + φ (1− αc) pcFX
)
> 0.
Differentiating (115a) with respect to time, substituting (4), (115e) and (182), eliminating
ξ by making use of (115a), yields the dynamic equation for real consumption:
c˙ = −Ψ−1 pcλ¯
pucc
(
r? − ρ (c, s, p, λ¯)) , (118)
where
Ψ = 1 +
pcλ¯
puccc
(1− αc) Πcc
p
. (119)
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Linearizing (184) together with the accumulation equation of habits (4) around the steady-
state, and denoting long-term values by a tilde, we obtain in a matrix form:
(s˙, c˙)T = J (s(t)− s˜, c(t)− c˜)T , (120)
where J is given by
J ≡
( −σ σ
Ψ˜−1 β+2σu˜cc Γ (β + σ)
)
, (121)
with
Ψ˜ = 1 +
β + σ (1− γ)
² (β + σ)
c˜D (1− αc)
Y˜
[
χ (1− αK) + X˜Y˜ νX +
p˜c˜F
Y˜
φ (1− αc)
] > 1. (122)
Using (35b), the determinant denoted by Det of the linearized 2× 2 matrix (188) is unam-
biguously negative:
Det J = −Ψ˜−1σ
²
[β + σ (1− γ)]
{
[γ + ² (1− γ)]− (1− αc) Πcc˜
p˜
}
< 0, (123)
where 0 < Ψ˜−1 < 1. The trace denoted by Tr is given by:
Tr J = β = r? > 0. (124)
The characteristic roots obtained from the 2× 2 linearized matrix J write as follows:
µi ≡ 12
{
TrJ ±
√
(TrJ)2 − 4DetJ
}
≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (125)
Since the system features one state variable, s, and one jump variable, c, the equilibrium yields
a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path. It is straightforward to show that setting γ = 0
yields a stable root which simplifies to µγ=01 = −σ.
Stable solutions paths are given by:
s(t)− s˜ = B1eµ1t, c(t)− c˜ = ω12B1eµ1t, (126)
where we normalized ωi1 to unity. The eigenvector ω
i
2 associated with eigenvalue µi is given by
ωi2 =
(
σ + µi
σ
)
> 0, i = 1, 2. (127)
Eigenvector ω12 =
(σ+µ1
σ
)
is positive if and only if:
[β + σ (1− γ)] [γ + ² (1− γ)] < ² (β + σ) . (128)
It can be shown that condition (128) is satisfied as long as ² > 1.
Consumption, Habit Persistence, and Permanent Income
Solving (180) and invoking the transversality condition yields:∫ ∞
0
pc
p (τ)
c (τ) e−r
?τdτ = b(0) +W (0),
whereW (0) denotes non-financial wealth, defined as the present discounted value of the future
flow of real disposable income expressed in terms of the foreign good, i.e.
W (0) =
∫ ∞
0
[
w (τ)n (τ)− T
p (τ)
]
e−r
?τdτ.
Linearizing pc(p(t))p(t) c(t) around the steady-state, substituting the stable solution for con-
sumption c(t) = c˜ + σ+µ1σ (s(t)− s˜) into the intertemporal budget constraint, this enables us
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to derive the long-run level of real expenditure, c˜, which satisfies the intertemporal solvency
condition given a stable adjustment:
c˜ = −Π˜
Λ˜
r? (σ + µ1)
σ
s0 +
r? − µ1
Λ˜
p˜r? [b0 +W (0)]
pc
, (129)
where p˜r? [b0 +W (0)] /pc is the permanent income defined as the annuity value of financial and
non financial wealth expressed in terms of the foreign good deflated by the consumption price
index. Additionally, we set:
Π˜ =
[
1− (1− αc) Πcc˜
p˜
]
= 1 +
(1− αc) c˜DY˜[
χ (1− αK) + X˜Y˜ νX +
p˜c˜F
Y˜
φ (1− αc)
] > 0, (130a)
Λ˜ = (r? − µ1)− Π˜
(
σ + µ1
σ
)
r?, (130b)
where Π˜ > 1.
Before deriving formal expressions of the marginal propensity to consume (MPC), we set
the following assumption :
Assumption 1 Π˜ < r
?−µ1
r? .
which in turn insures that 0 < Λ˜ < r? − µ1. From an economic point of view, inequality
Π˜ < r
?−µ1
r? holds as long as the domestic content of total consumption expenditure (1− αc) is
small, and both the share of exports in GDP X˜/Y˜ and the import content of total consumption
expenditure are large. Yet, as we shall see below, Assumption 1 holds even if the economy
displays a small trade openness.
The term in front of the real permanent income r
?−µ1
Λ˜
> 0 on the RHS of (129) represents
the long-run MPC of the real permanent income. Setting γ = 0 implies the multiplicative term
reduces to unity so that the long-run MPC is equal to one. Unlike, relaxing time separability
in utility implies that the long-MPC turns out to higher than one, at the condition that
(σ + µ1) > 0 which is satisfied.
Evaluating now the stable solution of c(t) at time t = 0, using the fact that s˜ = c˜, and
substituting (129), this enables us to derive the optimal initial level of real consumption:
c(0) =
(
σ + µ1
σ
)[
1 +
Π˜
Λ˜
r?µ1
σ
]
s0 − µ1
σ
r? − µ1
Λ˜
p˜r? [b0 +W (0)]
pc
, (131)
where r
?−µ1
Λ˜
> 0 represents the short-run MPC the real permanent income. As long as in-
equality 0 < Π˜ < r
?−µ1
r? holds (see assumption (1)), optimal consumption at time t = 0 is
positively correlated with the initial stock of habits and the short-run marginal propensity to
consume the real permanent income is smaller than unity. Notice that 0 > µγ>01 > µ
γ=0
1 = −σ.
The reason is that without habits, dynamics do not degenerate but the adjustment towards the
long-run equilibrium gets faster. Hence, the consumer without habits display a larger short-run
marginal propensity to consume.
In a small open economy model where the relative price of domestic goods is exogenous and
thereby remains constant over time, we have Ψ˜ = Π˜ = 1 and Λ˜ = −µ1σ (σ + r?). Consequently,
the short-run and long-run marginal propensities rewrite as follows:
c˜ =
r? (σ + µ1)
µ1 (σ + r?)
s0 +
σ (r? − µ1)
µ1 (σ + r?)
p˜r? [b0 +W (0)]
pc
, (132a)
c(0) =
σ + µ1
σ + r?
s0 +
r? − µ1
σ + r?
p˜r? [b0 +W (0)]
pc
. (132b)
From (132b), the condition for the short-term MPC to be smaller than unity is σ+µ1 > 0 which
always holds as long as γ > 0. In words, the short-run MPC is smaller with an exogenous p than
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with an endogenous p. The reason is as follows. Along the transitional path, the real exchange
depreciates which in turn implies a smoother real consumption adjustment (due to the the rise
in the consumption-based real interest rate which compensates the high time preference rate).
Such a consumption behavior is consistent with the intertemporal solvency condition as long
as the consumption falls by a larger amount in the short-run than that prevailing with a real
exchange rate constant over time. Without habits, µγ=01 = −σ such that the short-run and
long-run MPC coincide and are equal to unity.
How is Relevant Assumption 1?
In this paragraph, we provide a numerical analysis which supports Assumption 1 since
inequality Π˜ < r
?−µ1
r? could not be derived analytically. Adopting the benchmark parametriza-
tion discussed in section 4.1, we set: the weight of habits into utility γ at 0.8, the relative-risk-
aversion coefficient ² at 2.5, the speed at which habits catch-up with current consumption σ
at 0.65, the weight attached to consumption in the domestic good ϕ at 0.95, the elasticity of
substitution between the foreign and domestic good φ at 1.5, the output share of labor income
1 − αK at 0.65, the fixed time discount rate β = r? at 0.035, the elasticity of exports with
respect to the real exchange rate νX at 0.8, the share of domestic goods in consumption expen-
diture (1− αc) at 85%, the ratio of exports to GDP X/Y at 10%, the share of consumption in
the domestic good in GDP cD/Y at 57%, the share of consumption in the foreign good pcF /Y
at 10%, the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the marginal utility of wealth χ ≡ σNβNσN+βN
at 0.35 (setting σN and βN at 0.4 and 2.9). Numerical results for µ1 given by (125) and Π˜
given by (130a) are as follows: µ1 = −0.06, r?−µ1r? = 2.85, and Π˜ = 2.11. Hence, assumption
1 is satisfied for our benchmark parametrization. Notice that our calibration uses US data for
the period 1980-2008. Since the US economy is less open than most of OECD countries and
because Π˜ lowers as trade openness rises, we expect that this condition holds for a large range
of parametrization.
C.5 Long-Term and Short-Term Effects of a Fiscal Expansion on the Con-
sumption in the Domestic Good
Using the fact that cD = (1− αc) pcc, the steady-state change of consumption in the domestic
good after a permanent rise in gD is:
dc˜D
dgD
= φ (1− αc) cF dp˜dgD + (1− αc) pc
dc˜
dgD
< 0, (133)
where the negative sign follows from (88a) and (88b). Since consumption in the domestic good
influences the size of the spending multiplier, we compare the magnitude of the decline in c˜D
with the drop in total expenditure in consumption goods:
dc˜D
dgD
− pc dc˜dgD =
r?FknnpΦ1p2cαc
D
{αc + (1− αc)φ [γ + ² (1− γ)]}
−(Fkk + Fknnk)
D
p2cαc
p˜
[
X˜
p˜
(νX − 1) + φ (1− αc) c˜r?Φ1
]
≶ 0, (134)
where we used the fact that p˜Ω˜ = X˜p˜ νX + c˜
Fφ (1− αc)− X˜p˜ and one useful expression (35f).
Using the fact that cF = p′cc, the steady-state change of consumption in the foreign good
after a permanent rise in gF is:
dc˜F
dgD
= −φ (1− αc) c˜
F
p
dp˜
dgD
+
αcpc
p˜
dc˜
dgD
≶ 0, (135)
where the undetermined sign follows from (90a) and (90b).
Linearizing cD = (1− αc) pcc around the steady-state, evaluating the resulting expression
at time t = 0 and differentiating with respect to gD yields:
dcD(0)
dgD
= φ (1− αc) c˜F dp(0)dgD + (1− αc) pc
dc(0)
dgD
< 0, (136)
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where the negative sign follows from (101) and (108).
C.6 Time Preference Rate Dynamics
The specification of a habit-forming behavior implies a variable time preference rate. Following
an unanticipated permanent fiscal expansion, the time preference rate rises initially and then
decreases over time toward its steady-state value, β. The reaction of ρ reflects the temporary
gap between the marginal utility of current consumption and the marginal utility of future
consumption. In this section, we determine the stable transitional paths for the time preference
rate which have been computed numerically.
The solution of the time preference rate is obtained by linearizing (32) in the neighborhood
of the steady-state and using the fact that ρ˜ = β:
ρ(t) = β +
p˜ucc
pcλ¯
(β + σ) (c(t)− c˜) + p˜
pcλ¯
(β + 2σ) Γ˜ (s(t)− s˜) + (1− αc)
p˜
(β + σ) (p(t)− p˜) ,
= β +
p˜ucc
pcλ¯
(β + σ)
[
Ξ1A1eµ1t + Ξ2A2eµ2t
]
, (137)
where
Ξ1 = ω12 +
(β + 2σ)
(β + σ)
Γ˜
ucc
+
pcλ¯
p˜2ucc
(1− αc)ω14 = −
(β + 2σ)
(β + σ)
Γ˜
ucc
µ1
(β + σ − µ1) < 0, (138a)
Ξ2 = ω22 +
(β + 2σ)
(β + σ)
Γ˜
ucc
+
pcλ¯
p˜2ucc
(1− αc)ω24 = −
(β + 2σ)
(β + σ)
Γ˜
ucc
µ2
(β + σ − µ2) < 0, (138b)
with Γ given by (37). To determine the signs of Ξ1 and Ξ2, we made use of (60), i. e. ωi2 =
−
β+2σ
u˜cc
Γ˜+ λ¯pc
p˜2ucc
(1−αc)(β+σ−µi)ωi4
(β+σ−µi) > 0.
We estimate the initial reaction of the time preference rate by evaluating (137) at time
t = 0 and by differentiating w. r. t. gj (j = D,F ):
dρ(0)
dgj
=
p˜ucc
pcλ¯
(β + σ)
[
Ξ1
A1
dgi
+ Ξ2
A2
dgi
]
. (139)
D Welfare Analysis
In this section, we investigate the welfare effects of an unanticipated permanent rise in gov-
ernment spending, gj , falling on the domestic good (j = D) or the foreign good (j = F ). We
denote by φ the instantaneous welfare:
φ(t) = u (c(t), s(t)) + v (n(t)) , (140)
and by U its discounted value over an infinite horizon:
U =
∫ ∞
0
φ(t) exp (−βt) dt. (141)
We repeat by convenience the steady-state value of real consumption (see (10)):
c˜ =
[(
β + σ
β + σ (1− γ)
)
pcλ¯
p˜
]− 1
γ+²(1−γ)
. (142)
Differentiating the felicity function u (c) w. r. t. . c and s and evaluating at the steady state
using (193) yields:
u˜c = c˜−[γ+²(1−γ)] =
(
β + σ
β + σ (1− γ)
)
pcλ¯
p˜
> 0, (143a)
u˜s = −γc˜−[γ+²(1−γ)] = −γ
(
β + σ
β + σ (1− γ)
)
pcλ¯
p˜
= −γu˜c < 0, (143b)
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where a tilde over partial derivatives indicate that they are evaluated at the steady-state.
Furthermore, we have computed several useful expressions:
∆1 ≡ u˜cω12 + u˜s =
(
β + σ
β + σ (1− γ)
)
pcλ¯
p˜
[
σ (1− γ) + µ1
σ
]
< 0, (144a)
∆2 ≡ u˜cω22 + u˜s =
(
β + σ
β + σ (1− γ)
)
pcλ¯
p˜
[
σ (1− γ) + µ2
σ
]
> 0, (144b)
where we imposed the following condition which holds for plausible values of parameters (as
shown by numerical experiments):
σ (1− γ) + µ1 < 0, σ (1− γ) + µ2 > 0. (145)
D.1 Instantaneous Welfare Effects
We first linearize the instantaneous utility function (190) in the neighborhood of the steady-
state:
φ(t) = φ˜+ uc (c˜, s˜) (c(t)− c˜) + us (c˜, s˜) (s(t)− s˜) + vn (n(t)− n˜) , (146)
with φ˜ given by
φ˜ = u (c˜, c˜) + v (n˜) , (147)
where we used the fact c˜ = s˜ at the steady-state.
By substituting solutions for s(t), c(t) and n(t), we derive the two-dimensional stable solu-
tion for instantaneous welfare:
φ(t) = φ˜+
[
ucω
1
2 + us + vnL1
]
A1e
µ1t +
[
ucω
2
2 + us + vnL2
]
A2e
µ2t, (148)
where L1 = nkω13+npω
1
4 and L2 = nkω
2
3+npω
2
4; we drop the superscript tilde to save notation;
we stress that the partial derivatives are evaluated at the steady-state, i. e. uc = uc (c˜, c˜),
us = us (c˜, c˜), and vn = vn (n˜).
Differentiating (200) w. r. t. gj yields the steady-state change of instantaneous welfare:
dφ˜
dgj
= (uc + us)
dc˜
dgj
+ vn
dn˜
dgj
< 0, j = D,F, (149)
where uc + us = (1− γ)uc > 0 and vn = − λ¯p˜Fn < 0. Since dc˜dgj < 0 and
dn˜
dgj > 0, households
unambiguously experience instantaneous welfare losses in the long-run. As γ gets closer to
unity γ and labor supply gets less responsive, i. e. σN gets smaller, agents pay less attention
to the drop in absolute consumption in deriving utility and supply less labor, which in turn
dampen welfare losses.
We estimate the initial reaction of instantaneous welfare by evaluating (201) at time t = 0
and differentiating w. r. t. gj :
dφ(0)
dgj
=
dφ˜
dgj
+ [∆1 + vnL1]
A1
dgi
+ [∆1 + vnL1]
A2
dgj
, j = D,F, (150)
In a semi-small open economy model with fixed labor, φ drops on impact and overshoots its
new lower steady-state value, whereas the fall in consumption displays a smaller size in the
short-term than in the long-term. With elastic labor supply, besides the initial welfare losses
induced by the reduction of real consumption on impact, the rise in labor supply in the ST
magnifies the fall in utility. Therefore, φ falls in the short-term by a larger amount than in the
long-term.
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D.2 Overall Welfare Effects
So far, we have analyzed the instantaneous welfare implications of an unanticipated permanent
fiscal expansion, say at different points of times. To address welfare effects in a convenient
way within an intertemporal-maximizing framework, we have to evaluate the discounted value
of (190) over the agent’s infinite planning horizon. We will see numerically that the sluggish
adjustment in welfare that arises from consumption inertia enters in sharp contrast with the
adjustment of welfare with time separable preferences.
In order to have a correct and comprehensive measure of welfare, we calculate the discounted
value of instantaneous welfare over the entire planning horizon
U =
u˜
β
+
[∆1 + vnL1]
β − µ1 A1 +
[∆2 + vnL2]
β − µ2 A2. (151)
The first term on the right hand-side of (208) represents the capitalized value of instantaneous
welfare evaluated at the steady-state. The second and the third term on the RHS of (208)
vanish whenever preferences are time separable. The change in overall welfare after a fiscal
expansion will be estimated numerically.
E Simulations
E.1 Functional Forms and the Steady-State
Consumption-Side
To conduct the numerical analysis, we assume that the utility function is of the CRRA
form:
u (c) =
1
1− ²
( c
sγ
)1−²
, (152)
where the parameter ² corresponds to the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the parameter
γ indexes the importance of habit formation in the instantaneous utility function.
We assume that the representative household maximizes a CES function given by:
c (., .) =
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
cD
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (cF )φ−1φ ] φφ−1 (153)
with φ > 0 the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption of domestic and
foreign goods, given total expenditure measured in terms of traded goods:
E ≡ cD + pcF . (154)
At the first stage, the household minimizes the cost, E(t) = cD(t) + p(t)cF (t), for a given level
of subutility, c(t), where p(t) is the relative price of the foreign good or the real exchange rate.
For any chosen c(t), the optimal basket (cD(t), cF (t)) is a solution to:
pc (p(t)) c(t) = min{cD(t),cF (t)}
{
cD(t) + p(t)cF (t)(t) : c
(
cD(t), cF (t)
) ≥ c(t)} . (155)
The subutility function c (.) is linear homogeneous implies that total expenditure in consump-
tion goods can be expressed as E(t) = pc (p(t)) c(t), with pc (p(t)) is the unit cost function
dual (or consumption-based price index) to c. The unit cost dual function, pc (.), is defined as
the minimum total expense in consumption goods, E, such that c = c
(
cD(t), cF (t)
)
= 1, for a
given level of the real exchange rate, p. Its expression is given by
pc =
[
ϕ+ (1− ϕ) p1−φ
] 1
1−φ
. (156)
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The minimized unit cost function depends on the real exchange rate and is expressed in terms
of the foreign good. It has the following properties:
p′c = (1− ϕ) p−φ
[
ϕ+ (1− ϕ)p1−φ
] φ
1−φ
> 0, (157a)
p′′c = φ (1− ϕ) p−(1+φ)
[
ϕ+ (1− ϕ) p1−φ
] φ
1−φ
[
(1− ϕ) p1−φ
ϕ+ (1− ϕ) p1−φ − 1
]
< 0, (157b)
= φp′cp
−1
[
(1− ϕ) p1−φ
ϕ+ (1− ϕ) p1−φ − 1
]
.
Intra-temporal allocations between non tradable goods and tradable goods follow from Shep-
hard’s Lemma (or the envelope theorem) applied to (155):
cF = p′cc, and
pcF
pcc
= αc, (158a)
cD =
[
pc − pp′c
]
c, and
cD
pcc
= (1− αc) , (158b)
with the shares of the foreign and the domestic goods in consumption expenditure are given
respectively by
αc =
(1− ϕ) p1−φ
ϕ+ (1− ϕ) p1−φ , , (159a)
1− αc = ϕ
ϕ+ (1− ϕ) p1−φ . (159b)
Making use of expressions (157), the term −p′′cp/p′c can be rewritten as follows:
−p
′′
cp
p′c
= φ (1− αc) > 0, (160)
where φ (1− αc) represents the elasticity of consumption in the foreign good with respect to
the real exchange rate.
Production-Side
We assume that the production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form:
Y = f (k) = kαK , (161)
where αK corresponds to the capital share.
Partial and cross-partial derivatives of the production function write as follows:
Fk = αKkαK−1 = αK
Y
k
> 0, Fkk = − (1− αK) Fk
k
< 0,
Fn = (1− αK) Y
n
> 0, Fnn = −αK Fn
n
< 0,
Fkn = αK
Fn
k
> 0.
Export Function
Because the economy is semi-small, it is large enough in the production of the domestic
good to affect its relative price and thus the nation’s real exchange rate p. Following Kollman
[2001], we assume that this influence is captured by an export function, X (p) which takes a
power form:
X = X (p) = γXpνX , (162)
where γX > 0 is a constant and νX represents the price elasticity of the home country’s exports.
Note that in the limiting case, of a perfectly elastic export demand function, i. e. νX = +∞,
the real exchange rate is equal to unity.
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By making use of the functional form for the export function (162), we can rewrite the
reaction of export and consumption in the domestic good w. r. t. the real exchange rate as
follows:
Θ =
(
Xp − pp′′c c
)
=
X
p
[
νX +
cD
X
φαc
]
> 0. (163)
Finally, we estimate at the steady-state the net export reaction function with respect to
the real exchange rate given by (68) by substituting the functional form for the export function
(see eq. (162)):
Ω˜ ≡ −1
p˜
[
X˜
p˜
− Θ˜
]
=
X˜
p˜2
[
νX + φ (1− αc) p˜c˜
F
X˜
− 1
]
> 0. (164)
where we used the fact that c
D
X αc =
pcF
X φ (1− αc).
Steady-State
The steady-state (86) can be rewritten as follows:
c˜ =
[(
β + σ
β + σ (1− γ)
)
pcλ¯
p˜
]− 1
γ+²(1−γ)
, (165a)
c˜ = s˜, (165b)
k˜
n˜
=
(
αK
r? + δK
) 1
1−αK
, (165c)
n˜ =
[
1
γN
λ¯
p˜
(1− αK)
(
k˜
n˜
)αK] 1²N
, (165d)
Y˜ = c˜D + I˜ + γX (p˜)
νX + gD, (165e)
b˜ = −
[
Y˜ − pc (p˜) c˜− I˜ − gD − p˜gF
]
p˜r?
, (165f)
b˜− Φ1k˜ − Φ2s˜ = b0 − Φ1k0 − Φ2s0. (165g)
with
c˜D = (1− αc) pcc˜, c˜F = αc
p˜
pcc˜, (166a)
Y˜ = k˜αK n˜1−αK =
(
r? + δK
αK
)
k˜, I˜ = δK k˜. (166b)
E.2 Eigenvectors and Real Eigenvalues
The Linearized Matrix
The linearized version of the dynamic system writes as follows(
s˙, c˙, k˙, p˙
)T
= J
(
s(t)− s˜, c(t)− c˜, k(t)− k˜, p(t)− p˜
)T
, (167)
where the linearized elements matrix, denoted by J , is given by
J ≡

−σ σ 0 0
a21 (β + σ) a23 a24
0 I˜c I˜k − δK I˜p
0 0 a43 a44
 , (168)
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with
a21 = −γ
²
{σ²− (1− ²) [β + σ (1− γ)]} , < 0,
a23 =
[β + σ (1− γ)]
² (β + σ)
c˜D
pc
(Fkk + Fknnp) < 0,
a24 = − [β + σ (1− γ)]
² (β + σ)
c˜D
p˜pc
[(β + σ)− Fknnp] < 0,
a43 = p˜ (Fkk + Fknnk) < 0, a44 = p˜Fknnp,
and I˜c = −c˜D/c˜ < 0, I˜k − δK = r? + Fnnk = r? + χFknn˜ > 0, and I˜p =
− Y˜p˜
[
χ (1− αK) + X˜Y˜
(
νX + c˜
D
X˜
αcφ
)]
< 0.
Determinant and Condition for Real Roots
Using functional forms, the determinant J of the matrix of the linearized system denoted
by b4 (see (44d)) writes now as follows:
Det J = b4 = −σ
²
[β + σ (1− γ)] [γ + ² (1− γ)]
{
(Fkk + Fknnk)
[
p˜Θ˜ + ν (1− αc) c˜D
]
+ p˜np [Fknr? − FkkFn]
}
> 0, (169)
where ν = 1[β+σ(1−γ)] is the long-run IES with time non separable preferences.
Adopting a similar procedure, we estimate the term b3/r? (see (44c)):
b3
r?
=
σ
²
[γ + ² (1− γ)] [β + σ (1− γ)]− p˜ (Fkk + Fknnk)
[
Θ˜ + (1− αc) c˜
D
p˜
[β + σ (1− γ)]
² (β + σ)
]
+ p˜np [FkkFn − Fknr?] > 0. (170)
and the condition (51) for real roots:(
b3
r?
)2
− 4b4 =
{
σ
²
[γ + ² (1− γ)] [β + σ (1− γ)]− p˜ (Fkk + Fknnk)
[
Θ˜ + (1− αc) c˜
D
p˜
[β + σ (1− γ)]
² (β + σ)
]
− p˜np [FkkFn − Fknr?]
}2
+ 4
σγ
²
{σ²− (1− ²) [β + σ (1− γ)]} [β + σ (1− γ)]
² (β + σ)
× (1− αc) c˜D (Fkk + Fknnk) ≷ 0, (171)
which is positive as long as σ is not too small and γ is not too close from unity.
Eigenvalues
We write out the two stable and two unstable eigenvalues:
µ1 ≡ 12
r? −
√√√√√(r?)2 + 2
 b3
r?
+
√(
b3
r?
)2
− 4b4

 < 0, (172a)
µ2 ≡ 12
r? −
√√√√√(r?)2 + 2
 b3
r?
−
√(
b3
r?
)2
− 4b4

 < 0, (172b)
µ3 ≡ 12
r? +
√√√√√(r?)2 + 2
 b3
r?
−
√(
b3
r?
)2
− 4b4

 > 0, (172c)
µ4 ≡ 12
r? +
√√√√√(r?)2 + 2
 b3
r?
+
√(
b3
r?
)2
− 4b4

 > 0, (172d)
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where b3/r?, (b3/r?)
2 − 4b4 are given by (170) and (171).
If preferences are time separable, the smallest eigenvalue and the highest eigenvalue reduce
to:
µγ=01 = −σ < 0, µγ=04 = r? + σ > 0. (173)
Eigenvectors
Eigenvector ωi2 writes as follows:
ω12 =
(
σ + µ1
σ
)
> 0, (174a)
ω22 =
(
σ + µ2
σ
)
> 0, (174b)
Eigenvector ωi3 writes as follows:
ω13 =
(p˜Fknnp − µ1) Ic (σ + µ1)
σ
{
µ1µ4 − p˜
[
(Fkk + Fknnk) Θ˜ + np (Fknr? − FknFn)
]} > 0, (175a)
ω23 =
(p˜Fknnp − µ2) Ic (σ + µ2)
σ
{
µ2µ3 − p˜
[
(Fkk + Fknnk) Θ˜ + np (Fknr? − FknFn)
]} > 0. (175b)
Eigenvector ωi4 writes as follows:
ω14 = −
p˜ (Fkk + Fknnk)
(p˜Fknnp − µ1) ω
1
3, > 0, (176a)
ω24 = −
p˜ (Fkk + Fknnk)
(p˜Fknnp − µ2) ω
2
3, > 0, (176b)
where the signs of ω12, ω
2
2, ω
2
3 and ω
2
4 stem from the following condition that we imposed (and
holds for a large range of parametrization):
0 < −p˜
[
(Fkk + Fknnk) Θ˜ + np (Fknr? − FknFn)
]
< σ (σ + β) ,
with β = r?.
Finally, we estimated eigenvectors for the time preference rate:
Ξ¯Ξ1 = Ξ¯
γ
² (β + σ)
{σ²− (1− ²) [β + σ (1− γ)]} µ1
(σ + µ4)
> 0, (177a)
Ξ¯Ξ2 = Ξ¯
γ
² (β + σ)
{σ²− (1− ²) [β + σ (1− γ)]} µ2
(σ + µ3)
> 0, (177b)
with
Ξ¯ =
p˜ucc
pcλ¯
(β + σ) = − (β + σ)
2
[β + σ (1− γ)]
²
c˜
< 0. (178)
F The Long-Run Adjustment of the Real Exchange Rate and
Habits
In this section, we solve (165a)-(165d) for the steady-state values of consumption, reference
stock, labor and capital stock. In a first step, we solve (165c)-(165d) for the steady-state values
of physical capital and employment:
k˜ = k
(
λ¯, p˜
)
, n˜ = n
(
λ¯, p˜
)
, (179)
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with
ηk,λ¯ ≡
∂k˜
∂λ¯
λ¯
k˜
= −FknFkkk˜ vn
vnn
= σN > 0, (180a)
ηk,p ≡ ∂k˜
∂p˜
p˜
k˜
= FknFkkk˜
vn
vnn
= −σN < 0, (180b)
ηn,λ¯ ≡
∂n˜
∂λ¯
λ¯
n˜
=
vn
vnnn˜
= σN > 0, (180c)
ηn,p ≡ ∂n˜
∂p˜
p˜
n˜
= − vn
vnnn˜
= −σN < 0, (180d)
where we used the fact that Fkn = −Fkk k˜n˜ (see property (18a)). Substitution of (179) into the
production function Y = F (k, n), enables us to solve for output. This yields:
Y˜ = Y
(
λ¯, p˜
)
, (181)
with
ηY,λ¯ ≡
∂Y˜
∂λ¯
λ¯
Y˜
= σN > 0, ηY,p ≡ ∂Y˜
∂p˜
p˜
Y˜
= −σN < 0. (182)
In a second step, we solve (165a)-(165b) for the steady-state values of consumption and the
reference stock:
c˜ = s˜ = c
(
λ¯, p˜
)
, (183)
with
ηc,λ¯ ≡
∂c˜
∂λ¯
λ¯
c˜
= −ν < 0, ηc,p ≡ ∂c˜
∂p˜
p˜
c˜
= ν (1− αc) > 0, (184)
where ν ≡ 1γ+²(1−αc) > 0 corresponds to the long-run intertemporal elasticity of substitution
for consumption. Substituting (183) into cD = (1− αc) pcc, we can solve for the steady-state
value of consumption in the domestic good:
c˜D = cD
(
λ¯, p˜
)
, (185)
with
ηcD,λ¯ ≡
∂c˜D
∂λ¯
λ¯
c˜D
= −ν < 0, ηcD,p ≡
∂c˜D
∂p˜
p˜
c˜D
= φαc + ν (1− αc) > 0. (186)
Inserting (179), (181) and (185) into the home good market-clearing condition, equation
(?? can be rewritten as follows (equation (11) in the text):
Y
(
λ¯, p˜
)
= cD
(
λ¯, p˜
)
+X (p˜) + δKk
(
λ¯, p˜
)
+ gD. (187)
In a third step, we insert steady-state functions (186) and (184) into the market-clearing
condition for the home good (165e), which may be solved for the long-run value of the real
exchange rate:
p˜ = p
(
λ¯, gD
)
, (188)
with
ηp,λ¯ ≡
∂p˜
∂λ¯
λ¯
p˜
=
{
σN
(
1− αK δKr?+δK
)
+ c˜
D
Y˜
ν
}
{
σN
(
1− αK δKr?+δK
)
+ c˜D
Y˜
(φαc + ν (1− αc)) + X˜Y˜ νX
} > 0, (189a)
ηp,gD ≡
∂p˜
∂gD
gD
Y˜
= − 1{
σN
(
1− αK δKr?+δK
)
+ c˜D
Y˜
(φαc + ν (1− αc)) + X˜Y˜ νX
} < 0,(189b)
where we have rewritten k˜
Y˜
as αKr?+δK by making use of (165c). Note that ηp,λ¯ < 1 if the
long-run IES for consumption is smaller than the intratemporal elasticity of substitution φ.
This condition holds since cD and cF are substitutes (such that φ > 1) and empirical evidence
suggest that ν < 1. Additionally, the elasticity of the steady-state value of the real exchange
rate w. r. t. λ¯ rises with ν. Since ν is an increasing function of γ, ηp,λ¯ increases as γ approaches
unity.
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G Effects of a Permanent Rise in Government Spending: The
Case of Time Separable Preferences
In this section, we investigate the effects of fiscal shocks by considering the case of time separable
preferences (i.e. setting γ = 0).
G.1 First-Order Conditions
To obtain the macroeconomic equilibrium, we first derive the optimality conditions for house-
holds and firms and combine these with the accumulation equations. This leads to the set of
equations:
uc (c) =
pc (p)λ
p
, (190a)
vn (n) = −λ
p
w, (190b)
Fk = rK + δK , Fn = w, (190c)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (190d)
p˙ = p [Fk (k, n)− δK − r?] , (190e)
k˙ = F (k, n)− cD −X (p)− gD − δKk, (190f)
b˙ =
1
p
[
r?pb+ F (k, n)− pc (p) c− I −
(
gD + pgF
)]
, (190g)
together with the transversality conditions:
lim
t→∞ λ¯b exp (−r
?t) = lim
t→∞
λ¯
p
k exp (−r?t) = 0, (191)
where λ is the co-state variable associated with dynamic equation (190g).
We first solve equation (190a) for consumption:
c = c
(
λ¯, p
)
, (192)
where the partial derivatives are given by
cλ¯ =
∂c
∂λ¯
=
pc
pucc
= −σc c
λ¯
< 0, (193a)
cp =
∂c
∂p
=
pcλ¯ (1− αc)
p2ucc
= (1− αc)σc c
p
> 0. (193b)
Using the Shephard’s Lemma, intra-temporal allocations between domestic goods and foreign
goods are: cF = p′cc and cD = [pc − pp′c] c and substituting (193), we solve for consumption in
the domestic and foreign goods:
cD = cD
(
λ¯, p
)
, cF = cF
(
λ¯, p
)
, (194)
where the partial derivatives are given by
cDλ¯ =
∂cD
∂λ¯
= −σc c
D
λ¯
, (195a)
cDp =
∂cD
∂p
=
cD
p
[φαc + (1− αc)σc] > 0, (195b)
cFλ¯ =
∂cF
∂λ¯
= −σc c
F
λ¯
< 0, (195c)
cFp =
∂cF
∂p
= −c
F
p
(1− αc) [φ− σc] < 0, (195d)
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where we assumed that σc < φc as empirical evidence suggest that σc < 1.
Using the fact that w = Fn (k, n), the first-order condition (190b) for labor rewrites as
−vn (n) = λpFn which can be solved for employment n:
n = n
(
λ¯, p, k
)
, (196)
where the partial derivatives are given by (22).
Using the fact that I = k˙ + δKk, the market-clearing condition (190f) can be solved for
investment in physical capital:
I = I
(
λ¯, p, k, gD
)
, (197)
where the partial derivatives are given by:
Iλ¯ =
∂I
∂λ¯
= Fnnλ¯ − cDλ¯ =
Y
λ¯
[
(1− αK)χ+ σc c
D
Y
]
> 0, (198a)
Ip =
∂I
∂p
= Fnnp −
(
Xp + cDp
)
= −Y
p
{
χ (1− αK) + X
Y
[
νX +
cD
X
(αcφ+ (1− αc)σc)
]}
= Ψ < 0,(198b)
Ik =
∂I
∂k
= Fk + Fnnk =
αKY
k
[
1 + χ
(1− αK)
σKN
]
> 0, (198c)
IgD =
∂I
∂gD
= −1 < 0. (198d)
G.2 Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions
Saddle-Point Stability and Formal Solutions for k(t) and p(t)
Inserting the short-run static solutions for labor (196) into the dynamic equation for the
real exchange rate (190e), and inserting the short-run static solution for investment (197) into
the accumulation equation of physical capital (6), the dynamic system writes as follows:
p˙ = p
{
Fk
[
k, n
(
λ¯, p, k
)]− δK − r?} , (199a)
k˙ = F
[
k, n
(
λ¯, p, k
)]− cD (λ¯, p)−X (p)− δKk − gD. (199b)
Linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting long values by a tilde,
we obtain in a matrix form: (
k˙, p˙
)T
= J
(
k(t)− k˜, p(t)− p˜
)T
, (200)
where J is given by
J ≡
 (r? + F˜nn˜k) Ψ˜
p˜
(
F˜kk + F˜knn˜k
)
p˜F˜knn˜p
 , (201)
where Ψ is given by (198c).
The determinant denoted by Det of the linearized 2 × 2 matrix (201) is unambiguously
negative:
Det J = p˜np (r?Fkn − FnFkk) + p˜
(
cDp +Xp
) (
F˜kk + F˜knn˜k
)
< 0, (202)
and the trace denoted by Tr given by
Tr J = r? + F˜nn˜k + p˜F˜knn˜p = r? > 0, (203)
where we used the fact that at the long-run equilibrium F˜nn˜k + p˜F˜knn˜p = 0.
The characteristic root obtained from J given by (201) writes as follows:
µi ≡ 12
{
r? ±
√
(r?)2 − 4Det J
}
≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (204)
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We denote by µ1 < 0 and µ3 < 0 the stable and unstable real eigenvalues, satisfying
µ1 < 0 < r? < µ3. (205)
Since the system features one state variable, K, and one jump variable, p, the equilibrium
yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path.
Stable solutions paths are given by :
k(t)− k˜ = B1eµ1t, p(t)− p˜ = ω12B1eν1t, (206)
where we normalized ωi1 to unity. The eigenvector ω
i
2 associated with eigenvalue µi is given by
ωi2 = −
p˜
(
F˜kk + F˜knn˜k
)
(
p˜F˜knn˜p − µi
) ≷ 0. (207)
Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Assets
We first linearize equation (66) around the steady-state:
b˙(t) = r?
(
b(t)− b˜
)
+ Ω˜ (p(t)− p˜) , (208)
with
Ω˜ ≡ 1
p˜
[
X˜
p˜
(ν˜X − 1) + c˜F η˜F
]
=
1
p˜
[
Θ˜− X˜
p˜
]
> 0, (209)
where the elasticities of exports and imports w. r. t. the real exchange rate are:
νX =
Xpp
X
> 0, ηF = −
cFp p
cF
> 0. (210)
The condition under which a real exchange depreciation leads to an improvement of the trade
balance evaluated at the steady-state (i. e. Ω˜ > 0) writes as follows:
p˜
X˜
Θ˜ = ν˜X + η˜F
p˜c˜F
X˜
> 1 (211)
Inserting stable solution for p(t), solving the differential equation leads to the expression,
and invoking the transversality condition (191), we obtain the linearized version of the nation’s
intertemporal budget constraint:
b0 − b˜ = Ω˜ω
1
2
µ1 − r?B1 = Φ1
(
k0 − k˜
)
. (212)
together with the stable solution for the stock of foreign bonds:
b(t)− b˜ = Ω˜ω
1
2B1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t = Φ1
(
k(t)− k˜
)
, (213)
where we let Φ1 =
Ω˜ω12
µ1−r? . While the sign of eigenvector ω
1
2 remains indeterminate, we will
assume thereafter that ω12 > 0 which implies that Φ1 < 0. Consequently, the current account
and capital investment are negatively correlated, in line with empirical evidence.
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G.3 Long-Term Effects of a Rise in Government Spending: The Case of
Time Separable Preferences
The steady-state of the economy is obtained by setting c˙, k˙, p˙, b˙ = 0 and is defined by the
following set of equations:
r? + δK = Fk
[
k˜, n
(
λ¯, p˜, k˜
)]
, (214a)
r?p˜b˜+ F
[
k˜, n
(
λ¯, p˜, k˜
)]
− pc (p˜) c
(
λ¯, p˜
)− δK k˜ − gD − p˜gF = 0, (214b)
F
[
k˜, n
(
λ¯, p˜, k˜
)]
= cD
(
λ¯, p˜
)
+ δK k˜ +X (p˜) + gD, (214c)
and the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint(
b˜− b0
)
= Φ1
(
k˜ − k0
)
, (214d)
where we used the fact that in the long-run I˜ = δK k˜, and we have substituted the short-run
static solution for labor and consumption in the domestic good which obviously holds in the
long-run.
Totally differentiating equations (137) yields in matrix form:
Fknnp Fknnλ¯ Fkk + Fknnk 0(
Ip + p˜Ω˜
) (
Iλ¯ − p˜cFλ¯
)
(Ik − δK) p˜r?
Ip Iλ¯ (Ik − δK) 0
0 0 −Φ1 1


dp˜
dλ¯
dk˜
db˜

=

0
dgD + p˜dgF
dgD
db0 − Φ1dk0
 . (215)
We used the fact that
(
c˜F + gF − r?b˜
)
= X˜/p˜ (see (89)) together with Fnnp = Ip + cDp +Xp
and p˜Ω˜ = Θ˜− X˜/p˜ and pccp − cDp = p˜cFp to rewrite
(
Fnnp − pccp − X˜p˜
)
as follows
(
Ip + p˜Ω˜
)
.
The determinant of matrix of coefficients denoted by D writes as follows:
D ≡ −Φ1p˜r?Fknnλ¯Θ˜− Fknp˜ (Ik − δK)
(
npc
F
λ¯ + nλ¯Ω˜
)
+ p˜ (Fkk + Fknnk)
(
Iλ¯Ω˜ + Ipc
F
λ¯
)
≶ 0. (216)
We rewrote (Iλ¯Fknnp − IpFknnλ¯) as follows:
Iλ¯Fknnp − IpFknnλ¯ = Fknnλ¯Θ˜ > 0, (217)
where we let
Θ ≡ Xp + cDp − σc
cD
p
=
[
νX +
cD
X
αc (φ− σc)
]
> 0. (218)
If Φ1 < 0 is small enough (in absolute terms), the determinant D is negative. Since for all
parametrization, the determinant D is negative, we will set this assumption thereafter.
Domestic Good gD
The steady-state effects of an unanticipated permanent increase in government expenditure
falling on the domestic good are obtained from the total differential of the equilibrium system
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(214) w. r. t. gD:
dp˜
dgD
=
Φ1p˜r?Fknnλ¯
D
+
p˜cF
λ¯
(Fkk + Fknnk)
D
= (+) + (−) ≶ 0, (219a)
dλ¯
dgD
= −Φ1p˜r
?Fknnp
D
+
(Fkk + Fknnk) p˜Ω˜
D
> 0, (219b)
dk˜
dgD
= −Fknp˜
D
[
npc
F
λ¯ + nλ¯Ω˜
]
> 0, (219c)
db˜
dgD
= Φ1
dk˜
dgD
< 0, (219d)
where D < 0, Ω˜ > 0 and Φ1 < 0.
Totally differentiating the short-run static solution for consumption and labor given by (192)
and (196), respectively, and substituting relevant expressions (219), we obtain the steady-state
changes of real consumption and employment after a permanent rise in gD:
dc˜
dgD
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dgD
+ cp
dp˜
dgD
,
= −cλ¯
D
{
Φ1p˜r?Fknnpαc − (Fkk + Fknnk) X˜
p˜
(
Ω˜ + σc (1− αc) c˜F
)}
< 0, (220a)
dn˜
dgD
= nλ¯
dλ¯
dgD
+ np
dp˜
dgD
+ nk
dk˜
dgD
,
=
Fkk
D
[
nλ¯p˜Ω˜ + npp˜c
F
λ¯
]
> 0, (220b)
where we used the fact that
−p˜Ω˜ + (1− αc) cFλ¯ λ¯ =
X˜
p˜
[(
νX +
p˜c˜F
X˜
(1− αc)φ
)
− 1
]
, (221a)
nλ¯p˜Ω˜ + npp˜c
F
λ¯
= nλ¯
X˜
p˜
{[
νX +
p˜c˜F
X˜
((1− αc)φ+ αcσc)
]
− 1
}
> 0. (221b)
Making use of (219) and (220b), we can compute the steady-state change of output after a
permanent rise in gD:
dY˜
dgD
=
p˜
D
[
nλ¯Ω˜ + npc
F
λ¯
]
[wFkk − (r? + δK)Fkn] > 0, (222)
where p˜
[
nλ¯Ω˜ + npc
F
λ¯
]
is given by (221b).
Totally differentiating the short-run static solution for consumption and labor given by
(192) and (196), respectively, and substituting relevant expressions, we obtain the steady-state
changes of real consumption in the domestic good after a permanent rise in gD:
dc˜D
dgD
= (1− αc)
[
φc˜F
dp˜
dgD
+ pc
dc˜
dgD
]
,
=
c˜D
λ¯D
{
Φ1r?Fknnλ¯λ¯αc (φ− σc)− (Fkk + Fknnk)
[
p˜Ω˜ + ((1− αc)σc + φαc) c˜F
]}
< 0,(223)
where
p˜Ω˜ + ((1− αc)σc + φαc) c˜F = X˜
p˜
{(
νX +
p˜c˜F
X˜
φ
)
− 1
}
> 0. (224)
Foreign Good gF
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The steady-state effects of an unanticipated permanent increase in government expenditure
falling on the foreign good are obtained from the total differential of the equilibrium system
(214) w. r. t. gF :
dp˜
dgF
= − p˜ [Fknnλ¯ (Ik − δk)− Iλ¯ (Fkk + Fknnk)]
D
> 0, (225a)
dλ¯
dgF
=
p˜ [Fknnp (Ik − δk)− Ip (Fkk + Fknnk)]
D
> 0, (225b)
dk˜
dgF
= − p˜ [Iλ¯Fknnp − IpFknnλ¯]
D
> 0, (225c)
db˜
dgF
= Φ1
dk˜
dgF
< 0, (225d)
where D < 0, Ω˜ > 0 and Φ1 < 0.
G.4 Short-Term Effects of a Rise in Government Spending: The Case of
Time Separable Preferences
From (219), a fiscal impulse raises the capital stock in the long-run. Differentiating the stable
solution for capital stock (206) yields: k˙(t) = µ1B1eµ1t > 0 with B1 = −dk˜ < 0. Consequently,
investment is unambiguously crowded-in by public spending on impact and the capital stock
rises monotonically towards its new long-run level. From the intertemporal solvency condition
(212), the long-run accumulation of physical capital yields a decumulation of traded bonds.
Hence, the open economy experiences a current account deficit along the transitional path.
Regarding the consumption-side, according to (192), the fall in private wealth together with
the real exchange rate appreciation drives down consumption. In the same time, the negative
wealth effect induces agents to work more. The real exchange rate appreciation raises further
labor supply by amplifying the drop in private wealth measured in terms of the domestic good.
H Effects of a Temporary Rise in Government Spending
Following Schubert and Turnovsky [2002], we define a viable steady-state i starting at time Tj
to be one that is consistent with long-run solvency, given the stocks of capital and habits, KTj
and sTj , and foreign bonds, nTj . We rewrite the system of steady-state equations (137) for an
arbitrary period j:
uc (c˜j , s˜j) +
σ
β + σ
us (c˜j , s˜j) =
pc (p˜j) λ¯j
p˜j
, (226a)
c˜j = s˜j , (226b)
r? + δK = Fk
[
k˜j , nj
(
λ¯j , p˜j , k˜j
)]
, (226c)
r?p˜j b˜j + F
[
k˜j , n
(
λ¯j , p˜j , k˜j
)]
− pc (p˜j) c˜j − δK k˜j − gDj − p˜jgF = 0, (226d)
F
[
k˜j , n
(
λ¯j , p˜j , k˜j
)]
= (1− αc) pc (p˜j) c˜j + δK k˜j +X (p˜j) + gDj , (226e)
and the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint(
b˜j − bTj
)
= Φ1
(
k˜j − kTj
)
+Φ2
(
s˜j − sTj
)
, (226f)
In a first step, we solve the system (226a)-(226e) for c˜j , s˜j , k˜j , p˜j , b˜j as functions of the
marginal utility of wealth, λ¯j , and government spending on the domestic gD and the foreign
good gF . We obtain the steady-state functions (94). The second step consists in determining
the equilibrium change of λ¯j by taking the total differential of the intertemporal solvency
condition (226f):
[vλ¯ − Φ1Kλ − Φ2mλ] dλ¯j = − [vgτ − Φ1Kgτ − Φ2mgτ ] dgτ , τ = D,F (227)
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from which may solve for the equilibrium value of λ¯j as a function of government spending gτ :
λ¯ = λ
(
gD, gF
)
, λgD > 0, λgF > 0. (228)
We assume that the small open economy is initially in steady-state equilibrium, denoted
by the subscript j = 0:
s0 = s˜0 = m
(
λ¯0, g
τ
0
)
, (229a)
k0 = k˜0 = k
(
λ¯0, g
τ
0
)
, (229b)
p0 = p˜0 = p
(
λ¯0, g
τ
0
)
, (229c)
b0 = b˜0 = v
(
λ¯0, g
τ
0
)
, (229d)
λ0 = λ¯0 = λ (gτ0 ) , (229e)
where s˜0 = c˜0, τ = D,F , and mgF = pgF = kgF = 0.
We suppose now that government expenditure changes unexpectedly at time t = 0 from the
original level gτ0 to level g
τ
1 over the period 0 ≤ t < T , and reverts back at time T permanently
to its initial level, gτT = g
τ
2 = g
τ
0 .
Period 1 (0 ≤ t < T )
Whereas the fiscal expansion is implemented, the economy follows unstable transitional
paths:
s(t) = s˜1 +A1eµ1t +A2eµ2t +A3eµ3t +A4eµ4t, (230a)
c(t) = c˜1 + ω12A1e
µ1t + ω22A2e
µ2t + ω32A3e
µ3t + ω42A4e
µ4t, (230b)
k(t) = k˜1 + ω13A1e
µ1t + ω23A2e
µ2t + ω33A3e
µ3t + ω43A4e
µ4t, (230c)
p(t) = p˜1 + ω14A1e
µ1t + ω24A2e
µ2t + ω34A3e
µ3t + ω44A4e
µ4t, (230d)
b(t) = b˜1 +
[(
b0 − b˜1
)
−
4∑
i=1
NτAi
µi − r?
]
er
?t +
4∑
i=1
NiA1
µi − r? e
µit, (230e)
with the steady-state values c˜1, s˜1, k˜1, p˜1, b˜1 given by the following functions:
s˜1 = m
(
λ¯, gτ1
)
, (231a)
k˜1 = k
(
λ¯, gτ1
)
, (231b)
p˜1 = p
(
λ¯, gτ1
)
, (231c)
b˜1 = v
(
λ¯, gτ1
)
, (231d)
where the marginal utility of wealth remains constant over periods 1 and 2 at level λ¯1 = λ¯2 = λ¯
after its initial jump at time t = 0.
Period 2 (t ≥ T )
Once government spending reverts back to its initial level, the economy follows stable paths:
s(t) = s˜2 +A1eµ1t +A2eµ2t, (232a)
c(t) = c˜2 + ω12A1e
µ1t + ω22A2e
µ2t, (232b)
k(t) = k˜2 + ω13A1e
µ1t + ω23A2e
µ2t, (232c)
p(t) = p˜2 + ω14A1e
µ1t + ω24A2e
µ2t, (232d)
b(t) = b˜2 +
N1A1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
N2A2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t, (232e)
with the steady-state values c˜2, s˜2, k˜2, p˜2, b˜2 given by the following functions:
s˜2 = m
(
λ¯, gτ2
)
, (233a)
k˜2 = k
(
λ¯, gτ2
)
, (233b)
p˜2 = p
(
λ¯, gτ2
)
, (233c)
b˜2 = v
(
λ¯, gτ1
)
, (233d)
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where gτ2 = g
τ
0 .
During the transition period 1, the economy accumulates (decumulates) habits, capital and
foreign assets. Since this period is unstable, it would lead the nation to violate its intertemporal
budget constraint. By contrast, the adjustment process taking place in period 2 is stable and
must satisfy the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint. At the same time, the zero-root
problem requires the equilibrium value of marginal utility of wealth to adjust once-and-for-all
when the shock hits the economy. So λ remains constant over the periods 1 and 2. The aim of
the two-step method is to calculate the deviation of λ such that the country satisfies one single
and overall intertemporal budget constraint, given the new relevant initial conditions, sT , kT
and bT , prevailing when the shock ends and accumulated over the unstable period. Therefore,
for the country to remain intertemporally solvent, we require:
b˜2 − bT = Φ1
(
k˜2 − kT
)
+Φ2 (s˜2 − sT ) , (234)
In order to determine the six constants A1, A2, A3, A4, B1, B2, and the equilibrium value
of marginal utility of wealth, we impose three conditions:
1. Initial conditions s(0) = s0, k(0) = k0, b(0) = b0 must be met.
2. The stock of habits and the stock of physical capital s and k remain continuous at time
T .
3. The intertemporal solvency constraint (234) must hold implying that the net foreign
assets remain continuous at time T .
Set t = 0 in solutions (230a),(230c) and (232a),(232c), equate (230a)-(230d) and (232a)-
(232d), evaluated at time t = T , one obtains
s˜1 +A1 +A2 +A3 +A4 = s0, (235a)
s˜1 +A1eµ1T +A2eµ2T +A3eµ3T +A4eµ4T = s˜2 +B1eµ1T +B2eµ2T , (235b)
c˜1 + ω12A1e
µ1T + ω22A2e
µ2T + ω32A3e
µ3T + ω42A4e
µ4T = c˜2 + ω12B1e
µ1T + ω22B2e
µ2T , (235c)
k˜1 + ω13A1 + ω
2
3A2 + ω
3
3A3 + ω
4
3A4 = k0, (235d)
k˜1 + ω13A1e
µ1T + ω23A2e
µ2T + ω33A3e
µ3T + ω43A4e
µ4T = k˜2 + ω13B1e
µ1T + ω23B2e
µ2T , (235e)
p˜1 + ω14A1e
µ1T + ω24A2e
µ2T + ω34A3e
µ3T + ω44A4e
µ4T = p˜2 + ω14B1e
µ1T + ω24B2e
µ2T . (235f)
Estimating sT , kT et bT from (230a), (232c) et (232e), substituting these into (234), and
substituting steady-state functions s˜i, k˜i, b˜i, the intertemporal solvency condition (i.e. bT =
b˜2 +Φ1
(
kT − k˜2
)
+Φ2 (sT − s˜2)) can be rewritten as
v
(
λ¯, gτ1
)
+
{[
v (λ0, gτ0 )− v
(
λ¯, gτ1
)]− 4∑
i=1
NiAi
µi − r?
}
er
?T +
4∑
i=1
NiAi
µi − r? e
µiT − v (λ¯, gτ2)
= Φ1
[
k
(
λ¯, gτ1
)
+
4∑
i=1
ωi3Aie
µiT − k (λ¯, gτ2)
]
+Φ2
[
s
(
λ¯, gτ1
)
+
4∑
i=1
Aie
µiT − s (λ¯, gτ2)
]
.(236)
Then, we approximate the steady-state changes of variable x = c, s, k, p, b with the differ-
entials:
x˜1 − x˜0 ≡ z
(
λ¯, gτ1
)− z (λ0, gτ0 ) = zλ¯dλ¯+ zgτdgτ , τ = D,F, (237a)
x˜2 − x˜1 ≡ z
(
λ¯, gτ2
)− z (λ¯, gτ1) = −zgdgτ , τ = D,F, (237b)
where dλ¯ ≡ λ¯− λ0.
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Plugging these expressions into (235), we obtain finally
A1 +A2 +A3 +A4 = s0 − s˜1 = −mλ¯dλ¯−mgτdgτ , (238a)
A1e
µ1T +A2eµ2T +A3eµ3T +A4eµ4T −B1eµ1T −B2eµ2T = s˜2 − s˜1 = −mgdgτ , (238b)
ω12A1e
µ1T + ω22A2e
µ2T + ω32A3e
µ3T + ω42A4e
µ4t − ω12B1eµ1T − ω22B2eµ2T = c˜2 − c˜1 (238c)
ω13A1 + ω
2
3A2 + ω
3
3A3 + ω
4
3A4 = k0 − k˜1 = −kλ¯dλ¯− kgτdgτ , (238d)
ω13A1e
µ1T + ω23A2e
µ2T + ω33A3e
µ3T + ω43A4e
µ4T − ω13B1eµ1T − ω23B2eµ2T = k˜2 − k˜1 = −kgdgτ ,
(238e)
ω14A1e
µ1T + ω24A2e
µ2T + ω34A3e
µ3T + ω44A4e
µ4t − ω14B1eµ1T − ω24B2eµ2T = p˜2 − p˜1 = −zgdgτ ,
(238f)
together with
4∑
i=1
NiAi
µi − r?
(
1− e(µi−r?)T
)
+Φ1
4∑
i=1
ωi3Aie
(µi−r?)T +Φ2
4∑
i=1
Aie
(µi−r?)T + vλ¯dλ¯
= −
{
vgτ − [vgτ − Φ1Kgτ − Φ2mgτ ] e−r?T
}
dgτ . (239)
The system composed by seven equations determine the six constants and the change of the
equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth. Unfortunately, the 7 × 7 system is too
complex to obtain analytical solutions with non-ambiguous signs. Hence, we cannot analyze
analytically the impact and dynamic responses of the economy upon temporary government
spending policies in a way that could done in a two-good semi-small open setup with time
separable preferences. Given the complexity of the system, such an analysis is best done by
using numerical simulation methods, which can be applied to the linearized model as presented
in this subsection.
H.1 Steady-State Changes
When the model features the zero-root property, transitory expansionary budget policies have
permanent effects. To see it more formally, it is convenient to write out first the long-run change
of key economic variable x = c, k, n, p, following a permanent rise in government spending by
differentiating the steady-state function of x = z
(
λ¯, gτ
)
:
dx˜
dgτ
∣∣∣∣
perm
= zλ¯
dλ¯
dgτ
∣∣∣∣
perm
+ zgτ = zλ¯λgτ + zgτ . (240a)
From (240), after a permanent fiscal expansion, the steady-state change of economic variable
x is the result of two influences: a wealth effect induced by the change in λ¯ and a demand
effect driven by permanently raised government spending. Differently, after a temporary fiscal
expansion, the demand effect is ineffective since gτ (τ = D,F ) is perfectly expected to revert
back to its initial level. The longer-lasting the fiscal expansion, the stronger the wealth effect
and the greater its impact on x˜.
The once-for-all jump of the marginal utility of wealth after a temporary increase in public
spending is a scaled-down version of that following a temporary expansionary budget policy:
dλ¯
dgτ
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
dλ¯
dgτ
∣∣∣∣
perm
θ = λgτ θ > 0, τ = D,F. (241)
where 0 < θ < 1 decreases as T gets larger. Since λgτ > 0 denotes the steady-state change of
λ¯ for a permanent variation in gτ , the change of λ¯ for a temporary policy is smaller but of the
same direction. This is quite intuitive since the wealth effect induced by the transitory rise in
government spending extends over successively shorter periods as the persistence of the fiscal
expansion diminishes.
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After a permanent fiscal shock, both the wealth effect and the demand effect impinge on the
steady-state changes of stocks of assets. By contrast, as long as the fiscal impulse is transitory,
the demand effect turns out to be ineffective since gτ reverts back to its initial level at time T .
Hence, the long-run reactions of x = c, k, n, p are solely driven by the wealth effect reflected by
a rise in λ¯. Restricting ourself to a rise in gD, we get:
dc˜
dgD
∣∣∣∣
perm
= mλ¯λgτ +mgD <
dc˜
dgD
∣∣∣∣
temp
= mλ¯
dλ¯
dgD
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (242a)
0 <
dn˜
dgD
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Nλ¯
dλ¯
dgD
∣∣∣∣
temp
<
dn˜
dgD
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Nλ¯λgD +Ngτ , (242b)
0 <
dk˜
dgτ
∣∣∣∣
temp
= kλ¯
dλ¯
dgD
∣∣∣∣
temp
<
dk˜
dgD
∣∣∣∣
perm
= kλ¯λgD + kgτ , (242c)
dp˜
dgτ
∣∣∣∣
perm
= pλ¯λgτ + pgτ < 0 <
dp˜
dgτ
∣∣∣∣
temp
= pλ¯
dλ¯
dgτ
∣∣∣∣
temp
, (242d)
where mλ¯ < 0, Nλ¯ > 0 (for all parametrization), kλ¯ > 0, pλ¯ > 0. Since the change of λ¯ for
a temporary policy is smaller that after a permanent fiscal expansion, inspection of equations
(242) show that consumption, labor and capital are unambiguously scaled-down versions of the
permanent policy effect and work in the same direction.
Like for consumption, labor and capital, we have hysteresis effects for the real exchange
rate as well. Yet, a temporary fiscal expansion does not dampen the response of p˜ resulting
from a permanent policy, i. e. is scaled down version of the permanent policy effect and work
in the same direction. By contrast, the long-term response of p˜ is reversed. More precisely,
after a permanent fiscal expansion, the steady-state change of the real exchange rate is the
result of two conflictory forces: a wealth effect induced by the rise in λ¯ and a demand effect
driven by permanently raised government spending. Nevertheless, it can be shown formally
that p must fall in the long-term. The explanation stems from the fact that the reduction of
real consumption is spread over the two goods. Thus the fall in cD is not large enough to
compensate for the increase in gD such that there is still an excess of demand which requires
a real exchange rate appreciation (i. e. p must fall in the long-run). By contrast, after a
temporary fiscal expansion, the demand effect which pushes up the relative price is ineffective.
Consequently, the real exchange rate unambiguously depreciates after a temporary
rise in government spending on the domestic good. The explanation is that the wealth
effect induces agents to raise labor effort while reducing real consumption. The positive labor
supply effect stimulates capital by raising its marginal product and boosts output. Since an
excess supply arises in the domestic good market, this requires a real exchange rate depreciation
which stimulates exports and encourages agents to substitute consumption of the domestic for
the imported good.
The steady-state and initial changes of output after a transitory rise in public purchases on
the domestic good are unambiguously positive:
0 <
dY˜
dgD
∣∣∣∣
temp
= (r? + δK)
dk˜
dgD
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ w˜
dn˜
dgD
∣∣∣∣
temp
<
dY˜
dgD
∣∣∣∣
perm
, (243a)
0 <
dY (0)
dgD
∣∣∣∣
temp
= w˜
dn(0)
dgD
∣∣∣∣
temp
<
dY (0)
dgD
∣∣∣∣
perm
, (243b)
The longer-lasting the fiscal expansion is, the stronger the wealth effect and the larger the long-
run and short-run expenditure multipliers after a temporary rise in gD. Interestingly, even if
the public policy is highly persistent, both the steady-state and impact expenditure multipliers
will not equalize to that after a permanent expansionary budget policy. The reason is that the
demand effect vanishes.
Keeping in mind that government spending is restored to its initial level, differentiating of
the home good market-clearing condition at the steady-state w. r. t. gD yields the long-run
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expenditure multiplier :
dY˜
dgD
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
c˜D
c˜
dc˜
dgD
∣∣∣∣
temp
+
X˜
p˜
(
νX + αcφ
c˜D
p˜
)
dp˜
dgD
∣∣∣∣
temp
, (244)
where we abstract from capital depreciation for simplicity. As long as the fiscal expansion is
temporary, the real exchange rate depreciates in the long-run which stimulates exports and
consumption in the domestic good (see the second term on the RHS of 244). Moreover, c˜D
falls in the long-run but by a smaller amount than after a permanent expansionary budget
policy. It is interesting to notice that the multiplier given by equation (244) is similar to that
after a permanent fiscal expansion falling on the foreign good. More precisely, the long-run
economic boom is driven by exports after a temporary fiscal expansion.
Finally, we investigate the size of the short-term expenditure multiplier by evaluating the
home good market-clearing condition at time t = 0 and differentiating this expression w. r. t.
gD:
dY (0)
dgD
=
cD
c
dc(0)
dgD
+Θ
dp(0)
dgD
+
dI(0)
dgD
+ 1, (245)
with Θ ≡ Xp
[
νX + c
D
X φαc
]
> 0. The first term on the RHS of (245) reflects the negative impact
on output triggered by the fall in consumption. The second term on the RHS of (245) represents
the influence of the initial change of p on output through its effect on exports and cD. While
the real exchange rate depreciates in the long-run, it appreciates on impact and eventually, by
a larger size than that after a permanent fiscal policy if the fiscal impulse is implemented over
a short-period. The reason is that the steady-state change of the real exchange rate over period
1 is the result of a wealth effect and a demand effect. Since the demand effect more than offsets
the wealth effect and since the latter displays a smaller size than after a permanent rise in gD,
the steady-state value of p˜ over period 1 is unambiguously smaller than after a permanent fiscal
policy. To see it formally, we approximate its steady-state change by using (229c) and (231c):
p˜1 − p˜0 = p
(
λ¯, gD1
)− p (λ0, gD0 ) = pλ¯dλ¯|temp + pgD < pλ¯dλ¯|perm + pgD < 0, (246)
where pλ¯ > 0, pgD < 0 and 0 < pλ¯dλ¯|temp < pλ¯dλ¯|perm. However, if the rise in government
spending is not short-lived, the real exchange rate appreciates on impact but by a smaller
amount than that after a permanent fiscal policy. Consequently, the initial drops in exports
and cD will be moderated compared to those following a permanent fiscal policy. To summarize,
if the fiscal shock is not too brief, private demand falls on impact, but by a smaller amount than
after a permanent fiscal policy. We have now to determine the direction of the initial reaction of
investment. We have shown previously that the short-run expenditure multiplier is positive but
displays a smaller size than after a permanent fiscal policy. Since private demand (households’
consumption and exports) is crowded-out by a lower amount than after a permanent rise in
gD, the smaller size of the short-run expenditure multiplier after a temporary fiscal shock
originates unambiguously from the a fall investment (as long as the shock is not too brief). If
the rise in government spending is not too brief, private demand is crowded-out
by a smaller amount than after a permanent fiscal impulse such that investment
must be crowded-out on impact by a larger one. In conclusion, the small size of the
initial expenditure multiplier after a temporary fiscal policy relies upon (1) the dramatic drop
in exports if the shock is short-lived, and (2) the crowding-out of investment is the fiscal shock
is not too short-lived.
I Labor Tax-Financing Fiscal Shocks
In this section, we estimate the long-run effects of a rise in government spending falling on the
domestic good gD associated with a rise in payroll taxes τF , which are adjusted accordingly to
balance the government budget:
gD + p˜gF = g = τF w˜n˜. (247)
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Accounting for payroll taxes in the profit maximization modifies the labor decision as follows
Fn = w
(
1 + τF
)
which in turn implies that vn (n) = −λp Fn(k,n)(1+τF ) . Setting
B =
(
αK
r? + δK
) 1
1−αK
, (248)
and substituting the steady-state level of capital-labor ratio k˜n˜ = B into the expression above
yields:
n˜ =
[
1
γN
λ¯
p˜
(1− αK) B
αK
1 + τF
]σN
(249)
Solving (249) for employment, we get:
n˜ = n
(
λ¯, p˜, τF
)
, (250)
with
²n˜,λ¯ ≡
∂n˜
∂λ¯
λ¯
n˜
= σN , (251a)
²n˜,p˜ ≡ ∂n˜
∂p˜
p˜
n˜
= −σN , (251b)
²n˜,τF ≡
∂n˜
∂τF
∂
(
1 + τF
)
n˜
= −σN . (251c)
In a second step, using the fact that c˜ = s˜, the following equation uc (c˜, s˜) + σβ+σus (c˜, s˜) =
pc(p˜)λ¯
p˜ can be can be solved for steady-state consumption:
c˜ = c
(
λ¯, p˜
)
, (252)
with
²c˜,λ¯ ≡
∂c˜
∂λ¯
λ¯
c˜
= −ν < 0, (253a)
²c˜,p˜ ≡ ∂c˜
∂p˜
p˜
c˜
= ν (1− αc) > 0. (253b)
Using the fact that cD = (pc − pp′c) c, we solve for steady-state consumption in the domestic
good:
c˜D = cD
(
λ¯, p˜
)
, (254)
with
²c˜D,λ¯ ≡
∂c˜D
∂λ¯
λ¯
c˜D
= −ν < 0, (255a)
²c˜D,p˜ ≡
∂c˜D
∂p˜
p˜
c˜D
= ν (1− αc) + φαc > 0, (255b)
where we used the fact that φ (1− αc) ≡ −p
′′
c p
p′c
.
Using the linear homogeneity of the production function, i. e. Y = F
(
k
n , 1
)
=
(
k
n
)αK n,
and substituting the steady-state function derived above, the market-clearing condition can be
rewritten as follows:
BαKn
(
λ¯, p˜, τF
)
= cD
(
λ¯, p˜
)
+X (p˜) + δKBn
(
λ¯, p˜, τF
)
+ gD. (256)
Denoting by ωC = pccY the share of total consumption expenditure in GDP, ωI =
I
Y the share of
investment in GDP, ωX the share of exports in GDP, totally differentiating (256) and collecting
terms yields:
σN (1− ωI)
[
ˆ¯λ− ˆ˜p
]
+ ωC (1− αc) ν ˆ¯λ− {ωC (1− αc) [ν (1− αc) + φαc] + ωXνX} ˆ˜p
= σN (1− ωI) τˆF + dg
D
Y
, (257)
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where ˆ˜x = dx˜/x˜ with x = c, p, n, k, b, λ and τˆF = dτF /
(
1− τF ).
Adopting a similar reasoning, the zero current account at the steady-state can be rewritten
as follows:
BαKn
(
λ¯, p˜, τF
)− pc (p˜) c (λ¯, p˜)− δKBn (λ¯, p˜, τF ) = gD + p˜gF . (258)
Denoting by ωB = r
?pb
Y the share of interest receipts from trade bonds holding in GDP, using
the fact that r?b˜− c˜F − gF = X˜, totally differentiating (258) and collecting terms yields:
ωB
ˆ˜
b+ [σN (1− ωI) + ωCν] ˆ¯λ− [σN (1− ωI) + ωC (1− αc) ν + ωX ] ˆ˜p
= σN (1− ωI) τˆF + dg
D
Y
. (259)
Finally, substituting steady-state functions into the linearized version of the intertemporal
solvency condition and totally differentiating yields:
ˆ˜
b+
[
Φ2
c˜
b˜
ν − Φ1 k˜
b˜
σN
]
ˆ¯λ+
[
Φ1
k˜
b˜
σN − Φ2 c˜
b˜
ν (1− αc)
]
ˆ˜p = −Φ1 k˜
b˜
σN τˆF (260)
Steady-State Effects of a Labor Tax-Financing Government Spending Shock
Total differentiation of the steady-state can be written in matrix form: −{ωC (1− αc) [ν (1− αc) + φαc] + ωXνX} [σN (1− ωI) + ωC (1− αc) ν] 0− [σN (1− ωI) + ωC (1− αc) ν + ωX ] [σN (1− ωI) + ωCν] ωB[
Φ1 k˜b˜σN − Φ2
c˜
b˜
ν (1− αc)
] [
Φ2 c˜b˜ν − Φ1
k˜
b˜
σN
]
1

 ˆ˜pˆ¯λ
ˆ˜
b

=
 σN (1− ωI) τˆF +
dgD
Y
σN (1− ωI) τˆF + dgDY
−Φ1 k˜b˜σN τˆF
 . (261)
where we restricted ourself to the case of a rise in government spending in the domestic good.
Determinant denoted by E writes as follows:
E ≡ [σN (1− ωI) + ωCν] [ωC (1− αc)αc (φ− ν) + ωX (νX − 1)]
+ωB
[
Φ1
k˜
b˜
σN − Φ2 c˜
b˜
ν
]
[ωC (1− αc)αc (φ− ν) + ωXνX ]
+ναc
(
ωC − ωBΦ2 c˜
b˜
)
[σN (1− ωI) + ωCν (1− αc)] + ωcαcνωX > 0, (262)
where the sign of E holds as long as ωB is small as data suggest; additionally, the term
[ωC (1− αc)αc (φ− ν) + ωX (νX − 1)] reflects the impact on the trade balance of a change
in the real exchange rate which is assumed to be positive and reflects the Marshall-Lerner
condition.
The steady-state changes after a rise in government spending are:
ˆ˜p
dgD
Y
= −
αcωCν + ωB
[
Φ2 c˜b˜ν − Φ1
k˜
b˜
σN
]
E
< 0, (263a)
ˆ¯λ
dgD
Y
=
ωC (1− αc)αc (φ− ν) + ωX (νX − 1)− ωB
[
Φ1 k˜b˜σN − Φ2
c˜
b˜
ν (1− αc)
]
E
> 0.(263b)
Combining (263) and (250), the steady-state change of labor after a rise in government spending
is:
ˆ˜n
dgD
Y
=
σN
E
{
αcωC [ν (1− αc) + φαc] + ωX (νX − 1)− ωBΦ2 c˜
b˜
ναc
}
> 0. (264)
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The steady-state changes after a rise in payroll taxes are:
ˆ˜p
τˆF
= −ωCαcνσN (1− ωI)
E
+
ωBσNν
[
Φ2 c˜b˜ (1− ωI) + Φ1
k˜
b˜
ωC (1− αc)
]
E
< 0, (265a)
ˆ¯λ
τˆF
=
σN (1− ωI)
E
[ωC (1− αc)αc (φ− ν) + ωX (νX − 1)] + ωB
E
Φ2
c˜
b˜
ν (1− αc)σN (1− ωI)
+
ωB
E
Φ1
k˜
b˜
σN {ωC (1− αc) [ν (1− αc) + φαc] + ωXνX} > 0. (265b)
Combining (265) and (250), the steady-state change of labor after a rise in payroll taxes is:
ˆ˜n
τˆF
= −σN
E
{
ν
(
ωC − ωBΦ2 c˜
b˜
)
[ωC (1− αc)αcφ+ ωXνX ]
+ωX [σN (1− ωI) + ωCαcν]
}
< 0. (266)
Suppose that the policy maker wishes to finance the rise in government spending with an
increase in payroll taxes, keeping the budget constraint balanced. For unchanged labor supply,
a rise in labor taxes yields a rise in tax revenue commonly labelled the tax rate effect. In
addition, a change in a distorsionary tax modifies the behavior of households. This induces a
tax base effect which works in opposite direction of the tax rate effect on public revenue. More
precisely, a rise in labor taxes raise tax revenue. However, as shown by equation (266), labor
supply falls which reduces the labor tax base. In addition, keeping in mind that w˜ = w
(
τF
)
with ˆ˜w
τˆF
= −1, the wage rate must fall by the same proportion than the rise in payroll taxes
which lowers further the labor tax base. As long as σN takes a plausible value, the tax rate
effect more than offsets the tax base effect which implies that a rise in labor taxes raises
fiscal revenues. This assumption reflects the fact that the economy moves along the positively
slopped side of the Laffer curve.
Keeping in mind that ˆ˜n
∣∣g,F = ˆ˜n
τˆF
τˆF
∣∣g,F + ˆ˜ndgD
Y
dgD
Y and by rearranging terms, we can
determine the size of the rise in payroll taxes τF
∣∣g,F after a rise in government spending dgDY
such that the government budget constraint (247) remains balanced:
τˆF
∣∣g,F = 1− ωG
ˆ˜n
dgD
Y
(1− αK)− ωG + ωG ˆ˜nτˆF
dgD
Y
> 0. (267)
According to (267) payroll taxes must rise after an increase in government spending.
Substituting (267) into ˆ˜n
∣∣g,F = ˆ˜n
τˆF
τˆF
∣∣g,F + ˆ˜ndgD
Y
dgD
Y , we get:
n˜
dgD
Y
∣∣∣∣g,F =
ˆ˜n
dgD
Y
[(1− αK)− ωG] + ˆ˜nτˆF
(1− αK)− ωG + ωG ˆ˜nτˆF
≶ 0, (268)
where the sign will be determined thanks to numerical experiments.
Numerical results for a labor tax-financed government spending policy are reported in
Table 2. A rise in government spending by 1 percentage point of GDP requires an increase
in the labor tax τF by 0.032 (τF rises from 0.444 to 0.476). While a rise in lump-sum taxes
produces only a wealth effect, a rise in labor taxes induces additional effects, say distorsionary
effects, which lower labor supply by offsetting the positive effect triggered by the reduction in
private wealth. We find that in the long-run, the negative influence of the rise in payroll taxes
necessary to finance the increase in public spending is large enough to more than offset the
positive influence driven by the wealth effect. This results in a steady-state fall in employment
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Table 2: Quantitative Effects of an Unexpected Fiscal Expansion Financed by a Rise in Payroll
Taxes (in %)
Variablesa (γ = 0.8, σ = 0.65)
A.Long-Term
Cons. in home good dc˜D -0.93
Exports dX˜ -0.11
Investment, dI˜ -0.01
RER, dp˜ -0.32
Labor dn˜ -0.04
Stock of Foreign Assets, db˜ -0.47
B.Impact
Consumption, dc(0) -0.42
Labor dn(0) 0.05
RER, dp(0) -0.38
Cons. in home good, dcD(0) -0.46
Exports dX(0) -0.13
Investment, dI(0) -0.38
Savings, dS(0) -0.47
Current Account, dca(0) -0.09
C.Multipliers
Short-Term Multiplier, dY (0)/dgD 0.03
Long-Term Multiplier, dY˜ /dgD -0.04
aWe consider a rise in gD which raises total government
spending by one percentage point of GDP and is financed by
a rise in payroll taxes by an amount dictated by (267). Param-
eters are those in the benchmark case. Impact and steady-state
changes are scaled by initial GDP. The fiscal multiplier has been
obtained by dividing the variation of GDP by the change in pub-
lic spending.
and physical capital, and thereby yields a negative steady-state balanced-budget multiplier
(-0.04). In contrast, in the short-run, as the real exchange rate overshoots its steady-state level
and pushes down further private wealth measured in terms of the domestic good, the effect on
employment of the sizeable real exchange rate appreciation counteracts the distorsionary effect.
This allows for an initial rise in employment and thereby a positive impact balanced-budget
multiplier, yet displaying a much smaller size (0.03) than that after a lump-sum tax-financed
public spending policy.
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Figure 3: Computed Transitional Paths after a Labor Tax-Financed Government Spending
Shock
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J Habits in Leisure and Fiscal Shocks
In this subsection, we provide a discussion about the effects of fiscal shocks by assuming that
households display a habit-forming behavior in leisure. We abstract from capital accumulation
in order to simplify the study of saddle-path stability conditions.
J.1 The Framework
The representative agent is endowed with a unit of time, supplies a fraction n(t) as labor,
and the remainder l(t) ≡ 1 − n(t) is consumed as leisure. At any instant of time, households
derive utility from consumption c(t), current leisure l(t) and are confronted to disutility from
their level of habits in leisure denoted by s(t). Hence, assuming that the felicity function is
additively separable in consumption and leisure, the representative, household maximizes the
following objective function:
U =
∫ ∞
0
{u (c) + v (l, s)} exp (−βt) dt, (269)
where β is the consumer’s subjective time discount rate, σc > 0 corresponds to the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution for consumption, and γ > 0 stands for the weight attached to
habits in leisure s into utility.
The stock of habits in leisure is defined as a distributed lag on past leisure’ levels:
s(t) = σ
∫ t
−∞
l(τ) exp (−σ (t− τ)) dτ, (270)
where the parameter σ indexes the relative weight of recent leisure in determining the reference
stock s. Differentiating equation (270) w. r. t. time gives the law of motion of habit stock:
s˙(t) = σ [l(t)− s(t)] . (271)
The flow budget constraint writes in the usual form:
p(t)b˙(t) = r?p(t)b(t) + w(t) (1− l(t))− pc(p(t))c(t)− T, (272)
where 1 − l = n. The government finances government spending on the domestic good g by
levying lump-sum taxes T , i. e. g = gD = T .
The macroeconomic equilibrium is described by the following set of equations:
uc (c) =
pcλ
p
, (273a)
vl (l, s) + σξ = −λ
p
w, (273b)
Fn (n) = w, (273c)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (273d)
ξ˙ = (β + σ) ξ − vs (l, s) , (273e)
F (n) = (1− αc) pcc+X (p) + g, (273f)
together with the accumulation equation of foreign assets (272), the accumulation equation of
habits (271) and appropriate transversality conditions.
We first solve equation (273a) for consumption:
c = c
(
λ¯, p
)
, (274)
where partial derivatives are given by (193). Using the Shephard’s Lemma, intra-temporal
allocations between domestic goods and foreign goods are: cF = p′cc and cD = [pc − pp′c] c and
substituting (193), we solve for consumption in the domestic and foreign goods:
cD = cD
(
λ¯, p
)
, cF = cF
(
λ¯, p
)
, (275)
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where partial derivatives are given by (195).
Substituting first the short-run static solution for consumption in the domestic good (275),
and solving the home good market-clearing condition (273f) for the real exchange rate yields:
p = p
(
λ¯, l, g
)
, (276)
where
²p,λ ≡ ∂p
∂λ
λ
p
= −(1− αc)ωcσc
F
> 0, (277a)
²p,l ≡ ∂p
∂l
l
p
= − l
n
1
F
< 0, (277b)
²p,g ≡ ∂p
∂g
Y
p
= − 1
F
< 0, (277c)
with F ≡ (1− αc) [φαc + (1− αc)σc] + ωXνX > 0; we specified the production function as
follows Y = nalphaN , with 0 < αN < 1.
To write the law of motion of real consumption in a more interpretable form, we calculate
the time preference rate denoted by ρL, defined as the proportional rate of decrease of marginal
utility of leisure expressed in present value terms (see e. g. Epstein [1987]):
ρL ≡ −d ln {[vc (l, s) + σξ] exp (−βt)}
dt
∣∣∣∣
l˙(t)=0
. (278)
By substituting the accumulation equation for habits (271) and the dynamic equation for its
shadow price (273e), and eliminating ξ by making use of (273b), the rate of time preference
writes as follows:
ρL(t) = β +
p
wλ
[
σvs − vlsσ (l − s) + (β + σ)
(
vl − wλ
p
)]
, (279)
where ρLl =
p
wλ (β + σ) vll < 0, ρ
L
s =
p
wλ (β + 2σ) Γ
L > 0, ρLp =
1
p
[(
ρL − β)+ (β + σ)], ρLλ =
−1p
[(
ρL − β)+ (β + σ)] and we set
ΓL = vls +
σ
β + 2σ
vss > 0. (280)
Differentiating (273b) with respect to time, substituting (271) and (273b), eliminating ξ by
making use of (273b), yields the dynamic equation for leisure:
l˙ = − (ΨL)−1 λpw
vlll
(r? − ρ (l, s, p, λ)) , (281)
where
ΨL = 1 +
λ
pFnn
vll
+
λ
pw
vlll
pll
p
> 0, (282)
with Fnn < 0, vll < 0 and pl < 0.
We assume that the instantaneous utility function takes the following form:
u (c) + v (l, s) ≡ 1
1 + 1σc
c1+
1
σc +
1
1 + ²
[
l
(s)γ
]1+²
, (283)
where σc stands for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption.
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Useful expressions evaluated at the steady-state denoted by a tilde write as follows:
v˜l +
σ
β + σ
v˜s = l˜−[²+γ(1−²)]
β + σ (1− γ)
β + σ
> 0, (284a)
− λ¯w˜
p˜v˜ll l˜
= −
v˜l + σβ+σ v˜s
v˜ll l˜
=
[β + σ (1− γ)]
² (β + σ)
> 0, (284b)
−(β + 2σ)
v˜ll
Γ˜L =
γ
²
{σ²− (1− ²) [β + σ (1− γ)]} > 0. (284c)
−
v˜l + σβ+σ v˜s
v˜ll l˜
=
β + σ (1− γ)
² (β + σ)
> 0. (284d)
Linearizing (281) together with the accumulation equation of habits (271) around the
steady-state, and denoting long-term values by a tilde, we obtain in a matrix form:(
s˙, l˙
)T
= J
(
s(t)− s˜, l(t)− l˜
)T
, (285)
where J is given by
J ≡
( −σ σ(
Ψ˜L
)−1
β+2σ
v˜ll
Γ˜L
(
Ψ˜L
)−1 [
(β + σ)− [β+σ(1−γ)]² pl l˜p˜
] ) , (286)
where
Ψ˜L = 1 +
β + σ (1− γ)
² (β + σ)
l˜
n˜
{
1
βN
+
1
ωXνX + ωC (1− αc) [φαc + (1− αc)σc]
}
> 1, (287)
and (
Ψ˜L
)−1 β + 2σ
v˜ll
Γ˜L = −
(
Ψ˜L
)−1 γ
²
{σ²− (1− ²) [β + σ (1− γ)]} < 0,(288a)(
Ψ˜L
)−1 [
(β + σ)− [β + σ (1− γ)]
²
pl l˜
p˜
]
=
(
Ψ˜L
)−1
(β + σ) Ψ˜L = β + σ. (288b)
The determinant denoted by Det of the linearized 2 × 2 matrix (286) is unambiguously
negative:
Det J = −
(
Ψ˜L
)−1 σ
²
[β + σ (1− γ)]
{
[γ + ² (1− γ)]− ²p˜,l˜
}
< 0, (289)
where 0 < Ψ˜−1 < 1 and ²p˜,l˜ < 0. The trace denoted by Tr is given by:
Tr J = β = r? > 0. (290)
The characteristic roots obtained from the 2× 2 linearized matrix J write as follows:
µi ≡ 12
{
TrJ ±
√
(TrJ)2 − 4DetJ
}
≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (291)
We denote by µ1 < 0 and µ2 > 0 the stable and unstable real eigenvalues, satisfying
µ1 < 0 < r? < µ2. (292)
Since the system features one state variable, s, and one jump variable, l, the equilibrium yields
a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path. It is straightforward to show that setting γ = 0
yields a stable root which simplifies to µγ=01 = −σ.
Stable solutions paths are given by:
s(t)− s˜ = B1eµ1t, l(t)− l˜ = ω12B1eµ1t, (293)
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where we normalized ωi1 to unity. The eigenvector ω
i
2 associated with eigenvalue µi is given by
ωi2 =
(
σ + µi
σ
)
> 0, i = 1, 2. (294)
Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Assets
Substituting the domestic good market clearing condition (273f) into the accumulation
equation of foreign assets (272), and substituting the short-run static solution for consumption
in the foreign good (275) yields:
b˙ = r?b+
X (p)
p
− cF (λ¯, p) . (295)
Substituting the short-run static solution for the relative price p (276), and linearizing equation
(295) around the steady-state leads to:
b˙(t) = r?
(
b(t)− b˜
)
+ Ω˜pl
(
l(t)− l˜
)
, (296)
where
Ω˜ ≡ Y˜
p˜2
[ωX (νX − 1) + ωCαc (1− αc) (φ− σc)] > 0. (297)
Inserting stable solution for l(t), solving the differential equation, and invoking the transver-
sality condition, yields the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint:
b0 − b˜ = Ω˜plω
1
2
µ1 − r?B1 = Φ1 (s0 − s˜) . (298)
together with the stable solution for the stock of foreign bonds:
b(t)− b˜ = Ω˜plω
1
2B1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t = Φ1 (s(t)− s˜) , (299)
where we let Φ1 =
Ω˜plω
1
2
µ1−r? > 0.
J.2 Habits in Leisure and the Long-Term Effects of Fiscal Shocks
Substituting first the short-run static solution for consumption, the steady-state of the economy
is obtained by setting l˙, s˙, b˙ = 0 and is defined by the following set of equations:
l˜ =
( β + σ
β + σ (1− γ)
) λ¯Fn (1− l˜)
p˜
−ν , (300a)
F
(
1− l˜
)
= cD
(
λ¯, p˜
)
++X (p˜) + g, (300b)
r?p˜b˜+ F
(
1− l˜
)
− pc (p˜) c
(
λ¯, p˜
)− g = 0, (300c)
and the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint(
b˜− b0
)
= Φ1 (s˜− s0) , (300d)
where αN = FnnY .
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Total differentiation of the steady-state (300) can be written in matrix form:
1 + νβN
l˜
n˜ −ν ν 0
αN
l˜
n˜ {ωC (1− αc) [φαc + (1− αc)σc] + ωXνX} −ωC (1− αc)σc 0
−αN l˜n˜ −ωC [αc + (1− αc)σc] ωCσc ωB
−Φ1 l˜b˜ 0 0 1


ˆ˜
l
ˆ˜p
ˆ¯λ
ˆ˜
b

=

0
dg
Y
−dgY
0
 , (301)
where we restricted ourself to the case of a rise in government spending in the domestic good.
Determinant denoted by H writes as follows:
H ≡ Φ1 l˜
b˜
νωB {ωC (1− αc)αc (φ− σc) + ωXνX}+ ναN l˜
n˜
{ωCαcαc [(1− αc)φ+ αcσc − 1] + ωXνX}
+
(
1 +
ν
βN
l˜
n˜
)
ωcσc {ωC (1− αc)αc (φ− 1) + ωXνX} > 0, (302)
where Φ1 > 0.
The steady-state changes after a rise in government spending are:
ˆ˜
l
dgD
Y
= − ν
H
{αcωC [(1− αc) (φ− σc) + σc − 1] + ωXνX} < 0, (303a)
ˆ˜p
dgD
Y
= − 1
H
{(
ν
βN
l˜
n˜
)
αcωcσc − νωBΦ l˜
b˜
}
< 0, (303b)
ˆ¯λ
dgD
Y
=
1
H
{(
ν
βN
l˜
n˜
)
ωC [αc [(1− αc) (φ− σc)− 1] + ωXνX ] + νωBΦ1 l˜
b˜
}
> 0. (303c)
According to (303), a fiscal expansion lowers private wealth which induces agents to reduce
their consumption in leisure and work more. While the wealth effect impinges negatively on
consumption, its drop is not large enough for the market-clearing condition to hold. Hence, the
real exchange rate appreciates which depresses exports and pushes down further consumption
in the domestic good. Differentiating the intertemporal solvency condition (300d) with respect
to government spending, we find that the fall in the stock of habits in leisure drives down the
stock of foreign assets. The explanation is that while consumption falls markedly on impact,
its drop is not large enough to compensate the decrease in the real disposable income as labor
supply exhibits a tenuous response in the short-run. In conclusion, we derive similar results
to those in the case of habits in consumption. Leisure and consumption fall while labor rises
in the long-run. The open economy experiences a current account deficit over the transition
towards the steady-state.
Yet, it is worthwhile noticing that leisure initially decreases but by a smaller amount than
in the long-run:
dl(0)
dgD
Y
= −µ1
σ
dl˜
dgD
Y
< 0, (304)
where 0 < −µ1σ < 1 and we used the fact that B1 = s0 − s˜. Consequently, instead of over-
reacting in the short-run, output rises gradually towards its new long-run equilibrium. Addi-
tionally, the wage rate decreases but exhibits a tenuous response. Linearizing the short-run
static solution for the relative price in the neighborhood of the steady-state, evaluating at time
50
t = 0 and differentiating w. r. t. gD = g, yields:
dp(0)
dgD
Y
=
dp˜
dgD
− plω12
ds˜
dgD
<
dp˜
dgD
< 0, (305)
where pl < 0 and ω12 > 0. From (305), the real exchange rate overshoots its steady-state level.
The reason is that the tenuous reaction of leisure and thereby the weak reaction of labor yields
a small rise in output. Though consumption falls strongly on impact, the rise in government
spending triggers an excess of demand in the home good market because higher domestic supply
fails to offset greater demand for the domestic good. For the market-clearing condition to hold,
a real exchange appreciation that lowers further cD and depresses exports is required.
Finally, habits in leisure lower the size of short-run government spending multipliers by
moderating the initial reaction of labor in comparison with the case without habits. However,
likewise consumption habits which imply that habit-forming consumers are confronted to a
larger steady-state fall in consumption than consumers having time separable preferences, the
presence of habits in leisure yields a larger steady-state fall in leisure and thereby a greater
long-run increase in labor. Hence, habits in leisure raises the size of the long-run government
spending multipliers in comparison with the case without habits.
If we allow for capital accumulation in a model with habits in leisure, the two-dimensional
stable solution would imply that labor displays a hump-shaped adjustment, i. e. overshoots
its steady-state level. Hence output peaks after a certain delay. Therefore, the introduction of
habits in leisure allows for giving rise to an output response in line with recent VAR responses.
Finally, we may expect that the weak response of output on impact yields a crowding-out of
investment expenditure by public spending in the short-run, stemming from the gradual and
sluggish adjustment of leisure.
K Debt-Financing Fiscal Shocks
The baseline neoclassical RBC model features infinitely-lived Ricardian households, whose
consumption choices are based on an intertemporal budget constraint. According to Ricardian
equivalence, the particular method used to finance public spending does not matter. Hence,
wether government expenditure are financed by means of public debt or taxation, a fiscal
expansion reduces the present value of after-tax income, thus producing a negative wealth
effect that induces agents to cut consumption expenditure by the same size. While we consider
that households display a habit-forming behavior, individuals behave like Ricardian-consumers
because we assume that the economy is populated by a large number of identical households
and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever. Hence, our results generalize in the
presence of non-balanced government fiscal expansion. More precisely, wether the government
budget is balanced or not does not affect qualitatively and quantitatively our results.
So far, we have assumed the government budget constraint is balanced. We now relax this
assumption and consider that the government may issue traded bonds measured in terms of
the domestic good, D(t), to finance its expenditure net of lump-sum taxes,
D˙(t) = r?D(t) + gD + p(t)gF − T. (306)
Government expenditure consists in three components: purchases of domestic goods, gD, and
import goods, gF , and net interest payments on outstanding public debt, r?p(t)D(t).
To rule out the possibility that the government ends with a positive debt or credit, we
impose the following condition:
lim
t→∞D(t) exp (−r
?t) = 0. (307)
We first linearize (306) around the steady-state:
D˙(t) = r?
(
D(t)− D˜
)
+ gF (p(t)− p˜) .
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Inserting the stable solution for (p(t)− p˜) given by (52d), the solution for the stock of
public (traded) bonds writes as follows:
D˙(t) = r?
(
D(t)− D˜
)
+ gF
2∑
i=1
ωi4Aie
µit.
Solving the differential equation leads to:
D(t)− D˜ =
[(
D0 − D˜
)
− V1A1
µ1 − r? −
V2A2
µ2 − r?
]
er
?t
+
V1A1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
V2A2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t, (308)
with
V1 = gFω14 > 0, V2 = g
Fω24 > 0, (309)
where the signs follow from ω14 > 0 and ω
2
4 > 0 .
Invoking the condition for intertemporal solvency (307), we obtain the linearized version of
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint:
D0 − D˜ = V1A1
µ1 − r? +
V2A2
µ2 − r? . (310)
The stable solution for net stock of public traded bonds finally reduces to:
D(t)− D˜ = V1A1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
V2A2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t. (311)
Inserting constants A1 and A2 given by (54), we obtain the linearized version of the in-
tertemporal budget constraint of government expressed as a function of initial stocks of capital
and habits
D˜ −D0 = Ψ1
(
k˜ − k0
)
+Ψ2 (s˜− s0) , (312)
with
Ψ1 =
(µ1 − r?)V2 − (µ2 − r?)V1
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)
(
ω23 − ω13
) , (313a)
Ψ2 =
(µ2 − r?)ω23V1 − (µ1 − r?)ω13V2
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)
(
ω23 − ω13
) , (313b)
where
(
ω23 − ω13
)
> 0, V1 > 0, V2 > 0.
Differentiating the government budget constraint (312) w. r. t. gD yields:
dD˜
dgD
= Ψ1
dk˜
dgD
+Ψ2
ds˜
dgD
, (314)
where the long-run change in net government debt will be estimated numerically. Differentiat-
ing (311) w. r. t. time, we obtain the transitional path for public debt:
D˙(t) = µ1Ψ1eµ1t + µ2Ψ2eµ2t. (315)
Differentiating the steady-state government budget constraint w. r. t. gD, i. e. r?p˜a˜ + gD +
p˜gF − T˜ , enables us to derive the long-run change of the required lump-sum tax:
dT˜
Y˜
dgD
Y˜
= 1 + ωD
dD˜
dgD
Y˜
1
D˜
+ ωFG
dp˜
dgD
Y˜
1
p˜
, (316)
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where ωD = r
?D˜
Y˜
is the share of interest payments on outstanding debt in GDP and ωFG is
the share of government spending on the foreign good in GDP. The details of derivation show
that long-run changes of public debt D˜ and lump-sum taxes T˜ do not affect consumption
and investment decisions. If the government decides to finance a rise in government spending
through issue of public debt, taxes must adjust so that the government’s budget restriction is
met. However, the sequence of taxes does not affect consumption choices as we shall show now
more clearly.
Solving (306) and invoking (307), we obtain the government’s budget restriction:
D0 =
∫ ∞
0
(T − g)−r?t dt, (317)
where we denoted by g = gD + pgF total government expenditure. According to (317), in-
tertemporal solvency requires that the initial debt D0 is equal to the present value of future
primary surpluses.
Combining the accumulation equation of financial wealth (77) and invoking the transver-
sality condition yields: ∫ ∞
0
pc (p(t)) c (t) e−R
K(t)dt = a(0) +W (0), (318)
where W (0) denotes human wealth, defined as the present discounted value of the future flow
of real disposable income measured in terms of the domestic good, i. e.
W (0) =
∫ ∞
0
[w(t)n(t)− T ] e−RK(t)dt. (319)
with RK the discounting factor:
RK(t) =
∫ t
0
rK(τ)dτ.
By substituting the government’s budget restriction (317) into (319), the expression of human
wealth can be rewritten as:
W (0) =
∫ ∞
0
[w(t)n(t)− g] e−RK(t)dt−D0 −
∫ ∞
0
D(t)
(
rK − r?) e−RK(t)dt. (320)
It it straightforward to see that the path of lump-sum taxes completely vanishes from the
expression of human wealth (320). Because the particular path for taxes does not alter house-
holds’ disposable income, real consumption choices are not affected either.
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